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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article argues that criminal trial juries perform an impor­
tant but inadequately appreciated social function. I suggest that 
jury trials serve as a means through which we as a community take 
responsibility for - own up to - inherently problematic judgments 
regarding the blameworthiness or culpability of our fellow citizens. 
This is distinct from saying that jury trials are a method of making 
judgments about culpability. They are that; but they are also a 
means through which we confront our own agency in those judg-
* A ssi stant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1989, Towson S tate; J.D. 
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ments. The jury is an institution through which we as individuals 
take a turn acknowledging and coming to terms with the difficult 
things we as a community find it necessary to do. 
I suggest that the jury's responsibility-taking role is important 
primarily because of what it may be understood to say about who 
we are as a community. My aim, therefore, is to examine one of the 
ways in which the criminal trial jury may function as an expression 
of community identity. I argue that the way in which we go about 
performing certain difficult societal tasks says something about 
what we stand for, what kind of people we are, and what sort of 
community we want to be. I suggest that the passing of judgment 
on our fellow citizens is just such a task. How we do it may be as 
important to us as what we do. In particular, we may want to face 
this difficult and defining task in a way that allows us to describe 
ourselves as a forthright and courageous community - a com­
munity willing to confront and acknowledge responsibility for its 
judgments. 
Conceptually, the argument operates at several levels of gener­
ality. Most broadly, I suggest that meaning does matter. I argue 
that the social meanings and expressive content of legal rules and 
practices ought to be understood as primary goods. Alongside con­
sequentialist arguments keyed to concerns such as efficiency and 
deterrence - and alongside normative arguments rooted in princi­
ples such as fairness, justice, and rights - lawyers need to find ways 
of arguing about meaning. Because arguments about social mean­
ing and expressive content are inevitably contextual and contingent, 
the subject lends itself less to abstract theorizing than to concrete 
illustration. Accordingly, although one of my claims is that lawyers 
ought to be more willing to argue about social meaning as a primary 
good in a wide range of contexts, the bulk of this article is ad­
dressed more specifically to the criminal trial jury. I hope to 
demonstrate that expressive content can be argued about coher­
ently, and that the criminal trial jury is an institution well suited to 
this form of argument. 
·More specifically still, I focus on just one of the myriad of po­
tentially meaningful aspects of the criminal jury trial and on just 
one of the many potential meanings which might be ascribed to that 
aspect. The critical variable for purposes of this argument is the 
extent to which the procedures governing the criminal jury trial 
tend to engender in jurors a sense of personal responsibility for the 
fate of the accused. The meaning I attempt to ascribe to that varia­
ble is courage, or rather a particular quality of forthrightness and 
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integrity for which courage is as good a label as any. I suggest that 
we might admire those individuals and communities who are willing 
to stand behind what they do. We might want to count ourselves 
among those who confront, rather than evade responsibility for, the 
difficult things which we as a society find it necessary to do. In 
particular, we might consider it cowardly and base to construct a 
system through which we could hold others responsible for their 
actions - for that is what we do though the criminal justice system 
- without any of us ever having to take responsibility for those 
assignments of responsibility. 
The structure of the argument is as follows: Part II describes 
and defends my approach. I argue that the meaning of a criminal 
trial jury may be as important as its consequences. I also defend the 
claim that the social meaning of legal institutions, such as the jury, 
is worth arguing about.1 
Part ID briefly describes the jury's responsibility-taking role and 
attempts to flesh out my claim regarding its potential expressive sig­
nificance. I defer until Parts IV and V a discussion of precisely how 
that role is manifested and how it is or might be enforced. Instead, 
Part III addresses the more fundamental, and more difficult, ques­
tion of why it might be seen as important to express, through the 
device of jury responsibility, the form of courage I describe. 
Part IV argues that recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking 
function has explanatory power. Several otherwise puzzling facets 
of the procedural and evidentiary structure governing the criminal 
trial jury can be partially explained or illuminated by ascribing this 
function to the jury. Specifically, I point to four aspects of jury trial 
practice and procedure: the uncertain status of jury nullification, 
persistent concerns that certain forms of evidence will "usurp the 
role of the jury," the doctrine of Caldwell v. Mississippi,2 and the 
invocation of "conscience" in prosecutorial argument. Each of 
these contentious areas makes more sense if viewed through the 
lens of jury responsibility, rather than solely through the lens of jury 
decisionmaking. 
1. Considerations of this sort, when acknowledged at all, are sometimes referred to as the 
"expressive" or "symbolic" functions of law. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' 
Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic 
Importance of Tort Reform, 23 GA. L. REv. 295 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. 
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1993). These terms, however, seem 
to me inadequate, insofar as they suggest a merely tertiary status for what I believe is a 
critical, if often-ignored, aspect of law. 
2. 472 U.S. 320 {1985). 
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In Part V, I ground my argument in concrete recommendations. 
In sum, jury decisionmaking in criminal cases ought to be struc­
tured in such a way as to ensure that each juror understands, ac­
knowledges, and confronts his or her agency in that jury's decision. 
Several concrete measures appear capable of achieving this end 
without unduly compromising the jury's ability to perform its more 
generally recognized decisionmaking function. First, if juries are to 
be the place where we take turns confronting and accepting individ­
ual responsibility for what we have collectively decided to do, we 
ought actually to take turns - all of us. We ought not be able to 
put that obligation on the shoulders of some identifiable subset of 
the community. Second, consistent with overwhelming current 
practice, unanimous verdicts ought to be required in criminal cases. 
Third, contrary to current practice, juries ought to be informed as to 
what punishment will be imposed in the event of a conviction. 
My fourth and final recommendation is more tentative. Jurors 
should be instructed in such a way as to encourage them to feel a 
sense of agency in bringing about the consequences of their deci­
sions. While this recommendation may appear on its face uncon­
troversial, its implications are serious, and its application uncertain. 
It amounts to a suggestion that juries should be made aware, albeit 
indirectly, of their power to nullify, but without being encouraged 
to use that power. I use the term "power" rather than "right" 
because I do not advocate nullification. On the contrary, I argue 
that jurors have a duty to bring in a conviction when the evidence 
so warrants; and a refusal to do so represents a breach of that duty. 
Nullification, on my view, is not a right that jurors ought to exer­
cise, but rather a risk that we ought to bear. 
II. WKY ARGUE ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE JURY? 
A. The Meaning of the Criminal Trial Jury 
The jury has been described and justified from a \vide range of 
perspectives. So why muddy the theoretical waters with yet an­
other justification? In particular, why seek to articulate an ad­
ditional role rooted in difficult-to-articulate and highly subjective 
notions of courage or cowardice? Four reasons: 
First, and most obvious, juries perform a range of roles which 
need not be mutually exclusive. Debate over the evidentiary and 
procedural rules and practices governing jury trials ought to be 
informed by the fullest possible understanding of the societal role 
played by those trials. Analysis of the jury should not, for the sake 
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of simplicity or theoretical elegance, ignore significant functions 
merely because they may be difficult to quantify. Imagine, for ex­
ample, a family lawyer studying potential reform in child custody 
law. He or she would recognize that families provide children with 
food, shelter, and education - three good justifications for the 
family as an institution. However, only the most narrow of 
Gradgrind's intellectual descendants would ignore things like love, 
companionship, and personal identity formation, merely because 
they are hard to define with precision. 
Second, recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking function 
does not require setting aside more traditional explanations for the 
jury. Nothing in this article is intended to deny that the jury's cen­
tral and primary function, both doctrinally and in fact, is and ought 
to be the fair and accurate resolution of disputed questions of fact. 
It would be a mistake, however, to allow the regulation of the jury 
trial, let alone its continued existence in various contexts, to turn 
entirely on its efficacy as a factfinding device. 
Among the many other functions assigned or attributed to the 
jury are those keyed to political, rather than strictly judicial, con­
cerns. At least since De Tocqueville pointed out the way in which 
the jury in nineteenth-century America served as both a locus for 
popular participation and a device for civic education,3 scholars 
have debated the propriety and efficacy of the jury as a civic or 
educational institution. These political or civic roles may be loosely 
referred to as the communitarian function of the jury. For example, 
it has been suggested that juries may help secure public acceptabil­
ity of otherwise controversial outcomes,4 or provide a needed sense 
of public catharsis.5 By one account, the criminal trial jury in par-
3. De Tocqueville opens his discussion of the jury by observing that "[i]t would be a very 
narrow view to look upon the jury as a mere judicial institution; for however great its influ­
ence may be upon the decisions of the courts, it is still greater on the destinies of society at 
large." ALExls DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Phillips Bradley ed. & 
Henry Reeve & Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf 8th ed. 1960) (1835). 
4. See, e.g., HARRY KAI.VEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 7 (1966); Charles 
Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1368 (1985) ("Many of the procedures of our legal system are best 
understood as ways to promote public acceptance of verdicts."). 
5. See, e.g., George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and 
the Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REv. 804, 809 (1994) (acknowledging that "the com­
munitarian value of trial by jury results from its ability to induce a societal catharsis"); 
Charles R. Nesson & Michael J. Leotta, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Cross-Exam­
ination, 85 GEO. LJ. 1627, 1688 (1997) ("The essence of this catharsis is a public airing of 
grievances of charges and rebuttals from all parties."). Chief Justice Berger has referred to 
the "therapeutic value of open justice," and has maintained that public jury trials provide "an 
outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion." Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. 
Vrrginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-571 (1980). But see Peter L. Arenella, Televising High Profile 
Trials: Are We Better Off Pulling the Plug?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 879, 886 (1997) (argu-
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ticular is described as performing three sorts of communitarian 
roles: "1) a vehicle for direct community participation in the crimi­
nal justice system; 2) a means by _which the community is educated 
regarding the criminal justice system; and 3) a ritual by which the 
faith of the community in the administration of justice is 
maintained."6 
. The communitarian perspective on the jury is illuminating in 
that it focuses attention upon the jury's role in the expression of 
community identity.7 In general, however, these analyses have em­
phasized the way in which the criminal law expresses community 
identity or community mores through the substantive content of 
rules and punishments.8 I suggest further that the very decision to 
use juries to make decisions may itself be a significant expressive 
act. 
Third, the jury is an institution which seems to call for, and be 
particularly suited to, the sort of social-meaning analysis I suggest 
ing that there is "no empirical evidence supporting his contention that open trials actually 
served this cleansing/purging function. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a trial's public 
nature will encourage appropriate co=unity catharsis when the public disagrees with the 
jury's verdict."). 
6. Harris, supra note 5, at 807-08 (acknowledging the importance of the co=unitarian 
function of the criminal trial jury but arguing that this function should give way to the jury's 
function of protecting the rights of the accused in those rare circumstances where the two 
functions come into conflict). 
7. Indeed, two co=entators have gone so far as to assert that "[i]t is now co=onplace 
to assert that the jury performs an important ideological or symbolic role." Peter Duff & 
Mark Fmdlay, Jury Reform: Of Myths and Moral Panics, 25 INTL. J. Soc. LAW 363, 363 
(1997); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED CoMMODITIES 173 (1996) ("Legal in­
stitutions can express culture, or they can help shape it. Where legal institutions help shape 
culture, they do so in part by instantiating and reinforcing particular conceptions of the na­
ture of persons and their good."); Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of 
Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 190, 192 (1990) (describing "a theory of jury 
responsibility, in which the jury is conceptualized as a democratic representative of the com­
_munity through its verdicts" and thus a body that should "convey the moral condemnation of 
the co=unity in a criminal case and the range of viewpoints of the co=unity in a civil 
case"); Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 60-61 (1994) 
("The significance of adjudication also lies in defining public values."). 
8. See, e.g., A.C. EWING, THE MoRALITY OF I'uNISHMENT WITII SoME SUGGESTIONS FOR 
A GENERAL THEORY OF ETHICS (1970) (describing punishment as "a form of language"); 
R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME 
& JuST. 1, 33 (1996) (describing punishment as "co=unication"); Joel Feinberg, The Ex­
pressive Function of Punishment, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
(Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RE­
TRIBUITVISM AND !TS CRITICS 1, 11-15 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Herbert Morris, A Paternal­
istic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHrr.. Q. 263, 264-65 (1981). For a concise overview of 
this literature, see Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the 
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEo. LJ. 775, 800-08 (1997). It is also arguable that 
some work which does not use the language of expression might best be understood as hing­
ing on the social meaning of certain punishments. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What is 
Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE LJ. 1055, 1059 (1998) (arguing that shame 
sanctions amount to a form of "official lynch justice" involving "an ugly, and politically dan­
gerous, complicity between the state and the crowd"). 
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in this article. The jury as an institution has a long and complex 
history, and one which is closely tied to Anglo-American history 
generally.9 It was not created by an Advisory Committee as a fo­
cused response to some clearly identifiable set of consequentialist 
concerns. Rather, it has evolved slowly, over time, and in ways inti­
mately connected to the collective self-understandings of the com­
munities it has served.10 Moreover, the jury has become a 
distinctively if not yet uniquely American institution.11 Even 
England, the historical source of our own heavy reliance on jury 
decisionmaking, has reduced dramatically its use of the institu­
tion.12 Yet we persevere. Despite persistent uncertainty over accu-
9. See JoHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES (1960) (describing the evolution of 
legal decisionmaking and dispute resolution by those other than full-time professional 
judges); WILLIAM FoRSYIH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (London, John W. Parker & Son 
1852) (seminal study of the early English jury trial); THOMAS GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING 
TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CruMiNAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 (1985) 
(describing the evolution of the criminal trial jury in England from the demise of the trial by 
ordeal in 1215 to the beginning of the nineteenth century). 
10. See DAWSON, supra note 9, at 1 (arguing that the structure of court systems through­
out history, including "the alternative or competing means by which group decisions could be 
made • • •  are a product and a reflection of many forces in society at every stage in their 
growth [and] also react on the societies that created them"). 
11. As both comparative law scholars and critics of the jury are quick to point out, the 
jury is far from universal. Continental systems following the inquisitorial model of criminal 
procedure make little or no use of juries. In France, for example, juries are used only in the 
cour d'assisses, the jurisdiction of which is limited to crimes for which the sentence is five 
years or more and which requires just a 213 majority verdict See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 113-14 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993); see 
also CoMPARATIVE CruMINAL PROCEDURE 73-74 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996). Germany 
does not use juries as we understand them but does employ lay decisionmakers in the form of 
mixed courts consisting of citizens and judges. See CruMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra, at 141-42; see also CoMPARATIVE CruMINAL PROCEDURE, 
supra, at 143; Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From 
Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 227 (1995). See generally CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995). The Nether­
lands does not use juries; nor does Luxembourg. Italy makes use of juries only at the appel­
late level; and Portugal only in cases involving crimes punishable by more than eight years 
imprisonment. See EC LEGAL SYSTEMS: AN INTRoDucroRY GUIDE (Maurice Sheridan & 
James Cameron eds., 1992) (France-33; Germany-41; Netherlands-25; Luxembourg-28; Italy-
36; Portugal-26). It is worth noting, however, that both Spain and Russia have recently rein­
troduced trial by jury in criminal cases. See GENNADY M. DANILENKO & WILLIAM BURN­
HAM, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 530-39 (1999); Stephen c. 
Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INTI.. & CoMP. L. REv. 241 (1998). 
Japan does not use juries. See Glenn Theodore Melchinger, For the Collective Benefit: Why 
Japan's New Strict Product Liability Law Is "Strictly Business," 19 U. HAw. L. REv. 879, 913 
n.207 (1997) ("Japan had a quick prewar 1923 experiment with jury trials for serious criminal 
cases with the Baishinhou [Jury Act], which went into effect in 1928 and was suspended 
permanently in 1943 . .. .  "); Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the 
Incidence of Litigation in Japan: A Structural Analysis, 25 INTL. LAW. 443, 450 (1991). Israel 
has never used juries, and India not since 1961. See STEVEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL 
AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN CoURTROOM XV (1994). 
12. Except in rare situations, such as libel cases, juries are not used at all in civil proceed­
ings in England, having been almost completely eliminated by the Supreme Court Act, 1981, 
§ 69 (Eng.). See generally JULIUS LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A CoMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH 
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racy and fairness of particular verdicts, Americans continue to hold 
the jury dear.13 Criminal jury trials continue to be an object of 
widespread public interest. Why? What role does the jury play in 
our collective self-understanding? Plausible answers to these ques­
tions, including the partial response I offer here, will need to be 
contingent, socially situated, and subjective. 
Fourth, criminal jury trials are relatively rare as a percentage of 
total adjudications. Nationwide, a substantial if not overwhelming 
majority of criminal convictions are a result of plea bargains rather 
than trials.14 In addition, a growing percentage of criminal cases 
that do go to trial are, at the election of the defendant, tried before 
judges rather than juries.15 These realities have led some commen­
tators to conclude that the criminal jury trial no longer plays a sig­
nifi.cant role in American life. Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss, 
for example, maintain that "[ o ]nly a shadow of this communitarian 
institution has survived into the urbanized America of the late 
twentieth century."16 This view overstates the demise of the crimi­
nal jury trial. There are, after all, still thousands of criminal jury 
trials conducted each year. In addition, trials, however rare, do 
provide a bargaining baseline for the vast majority of cases which 
result in plea bargains. More to the point, it is a mistake to conflate 
frequency with importance. 
AND AMERICAN Crvrr, DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 95-111 {1982). Even in 
criminal cases, where jury trials remain available in England, they have become quite rare. 
See Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. et al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modem Alternatives to Seventh 
Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 61, 71 {1988) ("[T]he British 
system continues to evolve toward further reduction of the availability of jury trials, even in 
criminal cases. "); see also Laura Mansnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, § 1 (National Report), at 9 ("[In Britain,] only 1 percent of civil trials 
and 5 percent of criminal trials are heard by juries."). 
13. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. 'fyler, The Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of the 
Criminal Trial Jury, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 333, 337 {1988) (showing 97% of respondents to 
survey viewed the jury as "somewhat or "very" important as a national institution). 
14. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNuAL REPORT 12 {1990) 
(showing that 86.5% of convictions in federal courts were through guilty pleas or pleas of 
nolo contendere); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CouRTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STA­
TISTICS 57 {1988) (showing percentages of all criminal cases disposed of through guilty pleas, 
ranging from 46.7% in Pennsylvania to 87.2% in California); RICHARD SoLARI, U.S. DEPT. 
OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM, 1988, at 47 tbl. 4.2a {1992) {deter­
mining that guilty pleas account for 93% of state court criminal convictions); see also Neil 
Vidmar et al., Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury? Consider Conviction Rate Data, 
80 JUDICATURE 286 (1997) (collecting conviction rate data from federal courts and from the 
state courts of North Carolina, Florida, California, New York, and Texas). 
15. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 922 {1994) ("[N)early half of the convictions in the 
cases that go to trial are the products of trials before judges sitting without juries.") (citing 
PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE CouRTS, 1988, at 1 (1990)). 
16. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 15, at 927. 
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Rare things can matter; and, in particular, they can matter be­
cause of what they mean. The actual infliction of the death penalty 
is rare, but people care about it a great deal. Flag burning may be 
even more rare, yet it has been the subject of heated public and 
political debate. The relative infrequency of criminal jury trials 
need not mean that they are insignificant. That rarity does suggest, 
however, that the importance of the criminal trial jury may lie as 
much in its symbolic or expressive value than in its narrowly instru­
mental use as a method for determining disputed questions of fact. 
B. Why Argue About Meaning? 
Underlying this entire argument is a claim that the social mean­
ing of a legal institution is worth arguing about. It is difficult to 
know how much need be said in defense of this general point. On 
the one hand, I certainly do not claim to have discovered the impor­
tance of social meaning in law. Legal Realists, Law and Society 
scholars of various stripes, Crits, Feminist Legal theorists, and 
Critical Race theorists, just to name a few, have from various per­
spectives highlighted the ways in which law can serve to embody, 
express, or legitimate underlying social values. In this sense, my 
focus on social meaning is nothing new. On the other hand, at least 
two concerns prompt me to say something in defense of my particu­
lar approach. 
First, even though it might be common knowledge that social 
meaning matters, it is knowledge often ignored. Lawyers and legal 
academics seem willing to confront the meanings or expressive con­
tent of rules and practices only when there is nothing else more 
manageable to argue about. In this sense we are too often like the 
economist in the old joke who is searching under a street light for a 
contact lens. A passerby offers to help, and asks the economist, 
"Where did you lose it?" Pointing to a dark spot down the street, 
the economist says "Over there." "So why are you looking here?" 
the passerby asks. "Because the light is better," responds the 
economist. 
My second reason for taking space to defend the importance of 
social meaning is that, unlike most others who have addressed the 
issue, I emphasize meaning as a primary good, rather than as a 
means to consequentialist ends. My point is not that we must un­
derstand the social meaning of rules so that we might better predict, 
understand, or evaluate the substantive impact of those rules. In 
this sense, my claim differs from prior work, and in particular from 
ideas advanced by Dan Kahan, Tracey Meares, Eric Posner, and 
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others who have recently called attention to the role played by the 
social meaning of law in securing obedience or achieving deter­
rence.17 I argue that we, as a community, might prefer to act nobly 
and bravely not only because doing so may accomplish more 
effective deterrence, but also because we want to be able to under­
stand and describe ourselves as noble and brave. 
What do I mean by "we"? Do I suggest that "we" at some level 
do or would agree on who we are as a community, if only a 
sufficiently appealing vision could be articulated with sufficient 
force and clarity? I do not. Despite my liberal use of the :first per­
son plural, I do not claim that there is some static and potentially 
definable "community identity" just out there waiting to be identi­
fied and elucidated. On the contrary, legal institutions play a role 
in community identity formation primarily because the question of 
who "we" are is perpetually in dispute and because there are few 
other places where we might be said to speak as a community. If 
the United States were a nation unified by religion, culture, or even 
by a powerful common enemy, it might not be necessary for our 
legal and political institutions to play a substantial role in the con­
struction or maintenance of collective meaning. We are not so uni­
fied. We are a diverse and chaotic nation of millions, tied together 
by neither common faith nor by common fear but, if at all, by how 
we have agreed to describe ourselves.18 If we are to be a com­
munity, rather than a mere assemblage, we need for our public in­
stitutions (and those who argue about and argue within those 
institutions) to provide fora through which we can go about the 
business of community self-definition. 
By distingllishing a community from a "mere assemblage" and 
by positing the importance of community identity formation, I do 
not mean for my argument to hinge on any mysterious notions of 
collective consciousness. It is possible to argue that a community is 
more than just the sum of its individual members - that the well­
being of the community need not be understood as merely the ag­
gregate well-being of its members. While sympathetic to this per-
17. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 
349 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CruM. 
L. REv. 191 (1998). For a an overview of this emerging approach to the study of social norms 
and deterrence, see Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 
(1998); see also T OM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
18. Consider Abraham Lincoln's description, in the Gettysburg Address, of Americans as 
"dedicated to a proposition" rather than to an institution, faith, or set of substantive goals. 
Granted, Lincoln's assertion was an act of construction rather than a historically accurate 
description, and one which was not immediately or universally embraced. But the point re­
mains. What are we dedicated to? 
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spective, I recognize that it is inordinately difficult to articulate 
clearly or persuasively.19 Accordingly, I do not rely on such a 
claim; or, to be precise, I rely only upon a weak version of the com­
munitarian perspective on the individual vis-a-vis society. For pur­
poses of my argument, it is enough to posit that individuals might 
want to understand themselves as belonging to a community de­
fined by certain traits or qualities.20 From there, it is but a small 
step to recognize that those traits or qualities might find expression 
through the structure and operation of public institutions, including 
but not limited to the jury. Put differently, substantive legal dis­
putes often serve as proxies for underlying arguments about who 
we are as a community. 
Granted that the social meaning of the institutions like the jury 
may in fact matter to people, what business does a law professor 
have arguing about it? Perhaps lawyers and legal academics should 
leave it to the sociologists and anthropologists to describe and de­
bate what the jury "means" to people in various contexts. Unfortu­
nately, we cannot afford to do so. Social scientists, despite De 
Tocqueville's precedent, so far have surprisingly little to tell us 
about the role played by the jury in modern America:21 Next to the 
virtual cataract of social-scientific work on public and institutional 
19. In particular, I am sympathetic to the claim, articulated most effectively by Michael 
Sandel, that individuals are as much a product of communities as vice versa, and that to 
envision people as isolated choosers - unconstrained self-actualizers using communities as 
methods of getting what they want or becoming who they want to be - is to miss much of 
what makes people who and what they are. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND nm 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE {1982). 
20. Accordingly, those uncomfortable with the anthropomorphism implicit in phrases like 
"community self-definition" should feel free to substitute them with "individual self­
definition through association with a larger group defined by particular traits or qualities," or 
any such equivalent formulation. What I do insist upon, however, is that community identity, 
however labeled, matters. It would simply be missing what makes us who we are to deny that 
communities can be constructed, maintained, and unified by more than their ability effec­
tively to aggregate individual materialistic preferences. People define themselves not only by 
what they want, but also by what they stand for and who they stand with. 
21. A substantial amount of social-psychological work has examined juror decision­
making processes. Significant empirical studies include: Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve 
Heads Better than One?, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205; Geoffrey P. 
Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing 
the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401 
(1990); Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 539 (1992); and David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: 
A Threat to Justice, 59 JumCATURE 478 (1976). For an overview of research on juror deci­
sionmaking in light of recently proposed reforms, see Phoebe Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, 
Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, in PSY­
CHOLOGY, PuBuc POLICY, & LAW {forthcoming). Regarding proposed reforms, see JURY 
TRIAL lNNovATioNs (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997). What remain largely un­
studied, however, are the attitudes and understandings of the community as a whole toward 
the use of juries to decide criminal cases. 
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attitudes toward related matters such as crime control and criminal 
sentencing, the social meaning of the jury remains largely 
unexamined.22 
Social scientific research into public perceptions and under­
standings of the criminal trial jury would be particularly useful 
given the extent to which public discourse is so heavily dominated 
by discussions of particular high-profile verdicts. Trials like those of 
O.J. Simpson and the Menendez brothers are exceptional, and it is 
at least likely that they are understood as such by the public. The 
little available evidence suggests that while many people are dis­
satisfied with particular verdicts and particular features of the crim­
inal justice system, most Americans continue to view the criminal 
trial jury as an important and even defining institution.23 How 
members of the public would defend that view, if they chose to, 
remains an unanswered question. 
In the end, however, the lawyer's work is distinct from, though 
hopefully informed by, that of the social scientist. Lawyers need 
not only to describe social meaning, but also to argue about it. If 
and when social scientists are able to offer thorough accounts of 
what the jury means, lawyers will still need to find ways of talking 
about what it ought to mean. 
There are two closely related reasons why lawyers should learn 
to argue about, rather than merely describe, the social meanings or 
expressive content of legal rules and practices. Both of the reasons 
depend, of course, upon the assumption that many people do in fact 
care about those meanings - that substantive rules and policies do 
sometimes serve in part as proxies in arguments grounded in com­
peting conceptions of community identity. First, a lawyer cannot 
represent his or her clients or constituents effectively unless he or 
she can find ways of giving voice to the things that really matter to 
those clients or constituents. Second, a lawyer cannot argue effec­
tively or persuasively unless he or she is able to speak to the things 
that really concern those whom he or she is called upon to persuade 
or come to terms with. If one's audience - be they judges, jurors, 
legislators, members of the public at large, or academic colleagues 
- really care, at some deep if not fully articulated level, about the 
social meaning of a rule or practice, the best efficiency or deter­
rence or other consequentialist arguments are unlikely to move that 
audience. 
22. A noteworthy exception is MacCoun & 'fyler, supra note 13. 
23. See id. 
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It is tempting to think that legal academics, as opposed to prac­
ticing lawyers or lawyer-politicians, can afford to ignore these sorts 
of "irrational" concerns. We cannot. At least we cannot if we de­
sire our work to have relevance within the real world in which the 
rules and regimes we critique must operate. We cannot afford to 
disregard the meaning of rules and practices because to disregard is 
to discount. To conclude that a rule or policy is desirable or unde­
sirable, wise or unwise, based on an evaluation of consequentialist 
concerns such as efficiency or deterrence is to argue about the effect 
that rule or policy will have on people. And to make that calcula­
tion without accounting for what the rule or policy means to those 
people (because meanings are too difficult to evaluate or quantify) 
would in some cases be akin to arguing that one's bank account is 
more important than one's spouse (because the value of the latter is 
so hard to quantify). 
In popular media, a lawyer is sometimes described as _a "mouth­
piece." Although probably not intended as a compliment, this de­
scription need not be understood as entirely pejorative. Setting 
aside the questionable implication that lawyers lack moral agency 
in the work they do for their clients, society needs mouthpieces. In 
a complex world, someone must strive to give voice to the concerns 
of their fellow citizens. If, as seems certain, people care about 
things like bravery and nobility, those who purport to speak for the 
people need ways of talking about those things. If lawyers are to 
speak - in courtrooms, in state houses, and through our writings 
- to the concerns of our fellow citizens, we cannot simply disre­
gard salient concerns because they may be difficult to articulate or 
impossible to quantify precisely. 
Lawyers, and legal academics in particular, seem to have lost 
track of a tremendous amount of territory between first principles 
and the bottom line. In some contexts, the importance of social 
meaning is evident. For example, in the debate over a potential 
constitutional amendment prohibiting the burning of the American 
Flag, it is impossible to ignore the expressive and symbolic compo­
nents. The issue is, in a sense, all about expression; and the flag is 
the very archetype of a socially significant symbol. In other con­
texts, however, it is tempting to continue to look at claims about the 
expressive or symbolic value of legal rules as arguments of last re­
sort - to be called upon only when nothing else is available. 
The resulting lacuna - the argumentative gap caused by an un­
willingness or inability to argue about social meaning as a primary 
good - might be called the problem of the last grizzly bear, be-
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cause it is well illustrated by the discourse of environmental law. 
Why would it bother us to cause the extinction of a species? Why 
care about the last grizzly bear, or the last bald eagle, let alone the 
last snail darter or spotted owl? Environmental lawyers and activist 
have of course assembled a repertoire of consequentialist argu­
ments for preservation, many of which are quite persuasive.24 
These arguments are not wrong,_ but they appear incomplete.25 I 
suggest that at least some of our reasons for not wanting to wipe 
out the grizzly bear have to do with what it would say about us as a 
community if we were willing to do so. Specific environmental is­
sues serve to some extent as proxies for deeper concerns about who 
we are and how we understand our relationship \vith nature. 
Nor is environmental law the only intellectual domain that suf­
fers from an inability to argue effectively about social meaning as a 
primary good. Why do many people object to chain gangs as a 
method of criminal punishment? Are chain gangs likely to have 
dangerous social consequences? Perhaps, but the point would be 
difficult to demonstrate. Is it the humiliation people object to? 
Perhaps, but being forced to dig ditches on the roadside hardly 
seems the most humiliating thing many prisoners are required to 
endure. Are chain gangs unconstitutionally cruel and unusual?26 
The United States Supreme Court has refused to so hold.27 I sub-
24. For example, perhaps a patch of rain forest holds a bug that will provide a cure for 
AIDS or cancer. We will never know if we continue to clear cut. Similarly, environmental 
lawyers are masters of the one-way-door argument: if we save it today, we can always decide 
to wipe it out tomorrow, but if we wipe it out today, we can never get it back. Economic 
arguments are available as well, such as the argument that it is only a market failure (in 
particular the failure to account for future generations' utility) which causes us to undervalue 
wilderness. 
25. See, e.g., David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REv. 619, 693-95 (1994) (arguing that traditional environmental jurisprudence is inade­
quate because "[i]t is difficult to include harmony or environmental damage as goods within 
the intellectual framework of liberalism"). 
26. On the constitutionality of chain gangs, see Tessa M. Gorman, Back on the Chain 
Gang: Why the Eighth Amendment and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of 
Chain Gangs, 85 CAL. L. REv. 441 (1997); Sander Jacobowitz, Rattling Chains and Smashing 
Rocks: Testing the Boundaries of the Eighth Amendment, 28 RUTGERS LJ. 519 (1997); Nancy 
A. Ozimek, Reinstitution of the Chain Gang: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 6 B.U. 
PuB. INT. LJ. 753 (1997); Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1459 (1997) (claiming chain gangs 
are unconstitutional); and Emily S. Sanford, Note and Co=ent, The Propriety and Constitu­
tionality of Chain Gangs, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1155 (1997) (conceding that "chain gangs 
would likely survive constitutional attack today"). 
27. See McLamore v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 934, 936 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
("Does the chain gang fit into our current concept of penology? If not, does it violate the 
Eighth Amendment? This is an important question never decided by the Court."). A ruling 
that chain gangs are unconstitutional would represent an exception to the longstanding back­
ground rule that requiring prisoners to work is not constitutionally problematic. See United 
States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914) ("There can be no doubt that the State has 
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mit that many people object to chain gang� because of what they 
say about us as a community. Forget the consequences, and set 
aside concerns about cruelty; we as a community, given our history, 
still might care about what it means to have a line of black men in 
chains paraded down the highway under the supervision of a white 
man with a shotgun. 
Some scholars have recently demonstrated a willingness to con­
front the messy fact that meaning matters. In addition to moral 
philosophers and criminal law theorists who have highlighted the 
social meaning of punishment, others have come to appreciate the 
significance of expressive concerns as a motivating force in the law. 
Richard Pildes, for example, has argued persuasively that the doc­
trine of Shaw v. Reno2s cannot be otherwise understood.29 
Bizarrely shaped voting districts are troubling because of what they 
say about us as a political and social community. If we are to argue 
persuasively about voting districts, Pildes argues, we will need to 
find ways of appreciating and articulating those expressive con­
cerns, however difficult they are to nail down.3o 
Nor will it suffice to say that arguments about important legal 
policy issues should be severed from the underlying questions of 
social meaning with which they are bound - that the formulation 
of community identity should take place elsewhere, and not pollute 
substantive debates. First of all, there is no elsewhere. There are 
no fora through which we speak as a legal and political community 
other than through our legal and political institutions. We have · 
modes of expression as individuals and as subgroups within the 
community as a whole, but if we are to express what it means to be 
a member of the community as whole, we can only do so through 
actions taken by that community as a whole. It is of course possible 
to imagine hortatory pronouncements by legislatures or a plebiscite 
wherein we announce that we would like to be understood, and 
would like to understand ourselves, as a brave or honorable people. 
But, as the saying goes, actions speak louder than words, and in this 
authority to impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime."); United States v. 
Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894) ("There is no question but that federal prisoners may be re­
quired to work in accordance with institution rules."). 
28. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
29. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 537 ("Shaw thus sets into motion constitutional doc­
trine ultimately concerned with social perceptions and collective understanding[] .... "). 
30. See id. at 484 ("That most people, judges included, recoil instinctively from willfully 
misshapen districts is understandable enough. Yet defining values and purposes that might 
translate this impulse into an articulate justifiable set of legal principles is no easy task."). 
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case infinitely so. If we consider it important to describe ourselves 
as brave, we have to find ways of acting bravely. 
The second reason why we cannot hope to sever substantive 
policy debates from the underlying questions of meaning for which 
those debates often serve as proxies is that we cannot exert com­
plete control over the meanings of our actions. Imagine, for exam­
ple, that a legislature were to try and argue the propriety of 
legislation providing for the use of chain gangs without getting 
muddled in the difficult business of what that practice might sym­
bolize. Perhaps the sponsors of the chain gang bill could affix a 
prologue to the proposed legislation: "The chain gangs provided 
for herein should not be interpreted as reminiscent of slavery." 
Meanings do not work like that. You cannot spit on a man and tell 
him not to take it as an insult. And you cannot behave as a coward 
and expect people to take your word for it that you are brave. 
Arguments of this sort will prove difficult for lawyers to learn to 
make. They will prove difficult not because they are necessarily an­
alytically complex, or conceptually subtle, but rather because they 
call for a mode of argument, a form of rhetoric, somewhat alien to 
legal academic discourse. The social scientist seeking to describe 
"attitudes" towards this or that institution may try to describe or 
report empirically what the institution "means" to a given group. 
The law-and-society scholar can then use that data to argue about 
what a given rule or practice will or will not accomplish. The moral 
theorist s�eking to argue the rightness or lack thereof of an institu­
tion or practice may attempt to demonstrate its consistency or in­
consistency with some set of principles. The lawyer, however, who 
seeks to argue about social meaning - who seeks to argue about 
what a practice ought to mean - faces a task different from any of 
these. Arguments about social meaning, if successful, lead not to 
conclusive proof, but to conditional, partial, and temporary assent. 
The question is not whether a given social meaning follows neces­
sarily from a given rule or practice. Instead, the question is whether 
it resonates as consistent with an evolving and multifaceted sense of 
community identity. Moreover, arguments about social meaning in­
evitably seek to create, as well as to identify, that meaning. The 
required mode of argument is therefore neither purely descriptive 
nor purely prescriptive. Instead, the operative rhetorical mode 
might best be described as ascriptive - an attempt to ascribe cer­
tain meanings to certain practices. The stance is as much one of 
invitation as that of argument, and the conclusion, therefore, is less 
the logician's "QED" than the preacher's "Can I get a witness?" 
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Finally, it would be unwarranted hubris- to presume that those 
who would attach importance to meaning are behaving foolishly or 
irrationally - to view it as unfortunate that people might place ex­
pressive content on a par with, or even above, "real" concerns such 
as material benefits, deterrence, or efficiency. While it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to examine, or even fully to elucidate, the 
position, it certainly cannot be dismissed as presumptively irrational 
for a person to believe that meaning contributes as much or more to 
well-being than does material comfort, physical safety, or wealth. 
That person might point out that history, psychology, and social sci­
ence, not to mention theology and philosophy, all provide argu­
ments for the proposition that well-being - happiness, if you will 
- is only weakly related to material prosperity. This is of course a 
difficult and contestable proposition, and one over which social­
psychologists in particular have become increasingly engaged. My 
point here is that it is not obviously foolish for a person to come to 
believe that our mothers were right: more stuff does not make one 
more happy. 
Beyond this, it would be equally reasonable for a person to con­
clude that what does conduce to real well-being, what does make 
people happy, is meaning. A person might well come to the conclu­
sion that those people are happiest who have found something 
worth sacrificing some material well-being for; and that being a 
member of a community which stands for something is more impor­
tant - more conducive to well-being - than being one of an as­
semblage of people who are marginally more wealthy or more safe. 
According to such a view, the capacity of an institution to express 
or provide a forum for the formation of community identity might 
well be as important as the capacity of that institution to achieve 
particular consequentialist ends. Again, this paper is hardly the 
place to address this fundamental question, but there is no need for 
me to do so. It is sufficient to acknowledge that when people -
our clients, constituents, and fellow citizens - behave as though 
the meaning of a practice matters as much as the material conse­
quences, we cannot safely or fairly dismiss them as foolish. 
ill. THE MEANING OF JURY REsPONSIBILITY 
In this Part, I offer my reasons for believing that the 
responsibility-taking function of the criminal trial jury may be 
worth recognizing and preserving. I do not, in this Part, delineate 
in detail the ways in which this function is manifested and enforced 
- a discussion I put off until Parts IV and V. Instead, and at some 
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risk of putting the cart before the horse, I focus in this Part on the 
more basic question of why responsibility taking might matter. 
That said, I can and should perhaps outline briefly the function I 
hope to describe and defend. Reduced to its bare bones, my claim 
has four elements. First, there are certain difficult and inherently 
problematic actions and decisions required of our society. By in­
herently problematic I mean actions and decisions which, however 
necessary or justified, can and should be troubling to us. Examples 
might include the allocation of scarce medical resources and the de­
cision to go to war. Guido Calabresi famously termed these inher­
ently problematic decisions "tragic choices."31 While I have no 
quarrel with Calabresi's label, my argument regarding how we as a 
community might desire to respond to those choices is fundamen­
tally at odds with his. 
The second element of my claim, and the one least provable, is 
that we as a community might consider it important to confront 
rather than hide from those actions and decisions. Specifically, I 
suggest that we might consider it nobler and braver to acknowledge 
the necessity for those decisions and actions, and to acknowledge 
our role in them, rather than to consign them to some procedural 
black box. This is distinct from the related claim that we should 
confront rather than hide from troubling decisions because doing so 
will encourage us to make those decisions more fairly and wisely. 
While I do make those sorts of consequentialist arguments on be­
half of my specific claim, I do not rely upon them. Instead, I hope 
to explore the more difficult-to-articulate possibility that we might 
want to behave bravely primarily because we want to be able to 
understand and describe ourselves as brave. 
Third, I suggest that judging our fellow citizens, which we do 
through the criminal justice system, is just such a difficult and 
troubling task. We have, as a community, no complete, shared un­
derstanding of when an individual's actions are fairly described as 
his or her own "fault." Thus it should not surprise us that judgment 
is troubling, for a thorough theory of criminal responsibility would 
require nothing less than the resolution of the difficult philosophi­
cal problem of free will. For this reason, the act of judgment is and 
will remain inherently problematic. I do not mean that it is unjusti­
fied. We have good and sufficient reasons for assigning criminal 
responsibility. Judging our fellow citizens is an unavoidable neces­
sity - justified, necessary, and troubling. And if one assents to my 
31. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
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suggestion that such inherently problematic acts ought when possi­
ble to be confronted and acknowledged, rather than disguised and 
denied, then perhaps we ought to devise or maintain practices or 
institutions through which we as a community, to the extent practi­
cable, own up to and accept responsibility for what we find it neces­
sary to do. 
Finally, my claim is that the criminal trial jury serves as just such 
an institution. It would be neither possible nor perhaps desirable 
for each member of the community to take personal responsibility 
for each act of judgment. But we can take turns. 
Two important distinctions are in order. First, I am not arguing 
that jurors should be accountable for their verdicts, whether to the 
public at large, to defendants, or to anyone else. In fact, as argued 
below, there is a sense in which a certain absence of accountability 
- in the sense of a freedom from any obligation to explain or jus­
tify verdicts - might be understood as a necessary condition for 
the sort of responsibility I would have jurors assume. I am arguing 
that jurors ought to feel a sense of responsibility for judgments of 
culpability, not that they ought to be held responsible for those 
judgments.32 
A second distinction is between those rules and practices that 
might preserve or engender a sense of resP,onsibility, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, those rules and practices that might 
increase the sense in which the jury is understood to be a 
responsibility-taking institution by the community at large. The dis­
tinction here is between psychological reality and public meaning. 
Stated differently, it might be profitable to sever the question of the 
jury's role in the courtroom (the jury's relationship with defendants 
and the court), from the question of the jury's role in the com­
munity (the public's perception of that role and the meanings at­
tached to that perception). Nonetheless, I largely conflate these 
two ideas. For the most part, I assume that what increases jurors' 
sense of responsibility will also tend to increase the ability of the 
jury to be perceived as a responsibility-taking institution. 
I make this assumption not because I believe it is necessarily 
correct in every case. On the contrary, I readily acknowledge the 
32. A related distinction is between the jury as "they " and the jury as "we. " The claim is 
not that jurors, as some identifiable subset of the population, are for some reason the right 
people to take responsibility for troubling judgments of culpability. Rather, the claim is that 
the jury is the institution through which each of us - all of us - takes turns taking responsi­
bility. When, therefore, I say "jurors " should do this or that, or when for convenience I 
speak of jurors as "they, " I should be understood as saying "each of us, in our occasional 
capacity as jurors. " 
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possibility that some procedures which actually increase juror re­
sponsibility might for various reasons not serve to further the ex­
pressive purposes I have described, either because the actual effect 
of those procedures will be misunderstood or because those proce­
dures have other expressive content. I assume a congruence be­
tween reality and perception merely because it seems the wisest 
default option, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. I am 
fully prepared to listen to, and indeed invite, analysis of the extent 
to which the rules and practices described below - rules and prac­
tices which I argue serve to preserve the jury's responsibility-taking 
function - might fail to enhance the jury's meaning as a 
responsibility-taking institution. 
The debate over the use of anonymous juries can help us under­
stand these distinctions. In recent years, an increasing number of 
courts and legislatures have been willing to protect the identity of 
jurors in criminal trials when necessary for reasons of safety or pri­
vacy.33 It has been further suggested that anonymity be routine, in 
order to alleviate juror fears, protect juror privacy, and facilitate 
better decisionmaking.34 Opponents argue, among other things, 
that anonymity will compromise juror accountability. 
At first blush it might appear that the claim set out in this article 
- we should "look each defendant in the eye," and "stand behind 
what we find it necessary to do" - would argue strongly against 
juror anonymity. In fact, I am unprepared to take a position on the 
issue, for reasons that track and help illustrate the distinctions de­
scribed above. First, my concern is with responsibility rather than 
accountability. It seems to me unnecessary, and arguably inap­
propriate, to hold jurors accountable to the public for their judg­
ments. As one commentator has argued, "we do not give jurors the 
robes, the tenure, the professional training, and the prerequisites to 
make it either fair or appropriate to ask them to play so public a 
role."35 My emphasis is rather on how jurors perceive their own 
roles and on the public meaning of that perception. 
A second difficulty inherent in the question of juror anonymity 
tracks the distinction between psychological reality and social 
meaning. On one hand, it is at least plausible that jurors free from 
any fear of reprisal or harassment will be better able to focus on the 
33. See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous 
Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 V AND. L. REv. 123 (1996). 
34. See id. 
35. Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict Inter­
views, 1993 U. Ju.. L. REv. 295, 314, quoted in King, supra note 33, at 141. 
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responsibility they bear in passing judgment. H so, anonymity 
might actually facilitate the jury's responsibility-taking role. None­
theless, the language used by opponents of anonymity - language 
like "noxious" and "star chambers" - suggests that courage would 
not be the primary. social meaning attached to the routine use of 
anonymous juries. One judge remarked that "[n]ext we'll be put­
ting all the judges under hoods."36 Juror responsibility may in gen­
eral serve as an expression of courage, but practices designed to 
facilitate that responsibility will not further the expressive purpose 
if they themselves at the same time express or symbolize, rightly or 
wrongly, a form of cowardice. 
In Parts IV and V, below, where I describe the ways in which 
the jury's responsibility-taking function is fulfilled and might be 
protected, I focus on doctrinal elements, which, unlike the question 
of juror anonymity, do not appear to present a potential disconnect 
between reality and perception. I describe aspects of the criminal 
jury trial that may promote an actual sense of responsibility on the 
part of jurors, aspects it seems safe to assume do or might also con­
tribute to our ability to understand the jury as a responsibility­
taking institution expressing or symbolizing the quality I have cho­
sen to label "courage." In this Part, however, my aim is to tackle 
two logically prior questions. Why might courage be considered 
worth expressing? And why might the jury be understood as a 
means of expressing it? 
A. The Problem of Judgment 
The criminal justice system brings us face to face with a deep 
tension in our collective understanding of human behavior. On one 
hand, we live in an age of cause and effect. Developments in social 
and behavioral sciences have taught us to look for social, environ­
mental, genetic, chemical, psychological, or other explanations for 
behavior. On the other hand, we recognize the necessity of living 
and acting as though notions of individual responsibility are mean­
ingful.37 We refuse, and rightly so, to abandon the idea of desert. 
36. King, supra note 33, at 123. 
37. See, e.g., Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of 
Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1915, 1916-17 (1995) (analyzing the 
responses of Roscoe Pound and others to the tension between social ideas of cause and effect 
and legal/moral notions of free will and personal responsibility); Rachel J. Littman, Adequate 
Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free Wil� 60 ALB. L. REv. 
1127, 1130 (1997) (defending free will as a descriptive concept and claiming that "the human 
ability to reason and act rationally can never be totally overborne by external influences" 
(footnote omitted)); John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of 
Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEo. LJ. 2045, 2046 (1988) 
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As a consequence, the criminal law struggles mightily with the 
question of when it is appropriate to hold an individual responsible 
for his or her actions.3s 
I make no attempt to canvass the millennia-old moral, religious, 
and philosophical debate over free will.39 I simply submit that the 
("[W]hile the notion of responsibility traditionally has been viewed as descriptive in nature, it 
is in fact an evolving prescriptive concept which serves to delineate the boundaries between 
those consequences for which the individual will be held accountable and those for which 
society will be so held."}. 
38. The resulting tension manifests itself in the criminal law not only through ongoing 
theoretical uncertainty over the appropriate definition of mens rea, but also through continu­
ing debates regarding specific doctrinal issues such as the insanity defense, the doctrine of 
duress, and criminal sentencing. 
39. Early sources include the following: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC 
WoRKS OF ARISTOTLE 935-1112 (W.D. Ross trans. & Richard McKeon ed., Random House 
1941) and Plato, Timaeus, in THE CoLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1151-211 (B. Jowett 
trans. & Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1994). Central 
philosophical works on free will would include: BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, ETHIC (W. Hale 
White & Amelia Hutchinson Stirling trans., Oxford Univ. Press .1923) (containing De 
Spinoza's philosophy of determinism); THOMAS HoBBES, BoDY, MAN, AND CITIZEN (Rich· 
ard S. Peters ed., Collier Books 1962) (collecting selections from Hobbes representing his 
attempt to reconcile free will and determinism); DAVID HUME, AN lNoUIRY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 90-111 {Charles W. Hendel ed., Library of Liberal Arts 1955) 
(containing Hume's attempt to reconcile free will and determinism); IMMANUEL KANT, 
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALS (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Pub· 
lishing Co. 1981); and JoHN LocKE, AN EssAY CoNCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Pe­
ter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975). Among modem book-length treatments, see 
EDWARD D'ANGELO, THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM (1968) (maintaining 
that human behavior, though caused, is and will remain fundamentally unpredictable); 
DANIEL C. DENNET, ELBOW RooM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 
{1985); J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
95-118 {1970} {addressing "expressive" value of the notion of responsibility, in that it allows 
the community to react to and express attitudes towards given forms of behavior); HANS 
JoNAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY 79-135 (1984) {delineating contexts in which the 
idea of responsibility is useful or indispensable}; MAruoN SMILEY, MoRAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CoMMUNITY: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A PRAGMATIC 
Po INT OF V mw {1992) (arguing that the philosophical approaches to the question of free will 
slight the pragmatic significance of community recognition of individual moral responsibil­
ity); GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF (1986) {describing possible alternative philo­
sophical approaches to the question of free will}; and DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THB 
AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE (Sidney Hook ed., 1958) (collecting articles on determinism and 
free will). Among book-length treatments of free will and the law, see FRANZ ALEXANDER 
& HuGo STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PuBuc 211-12 {1956) {lamenting the 
fact that attempts to make the criminal justice system more progressive and responsive to the 
causes of criminal behavior must confront an enduring popular desire for retribution); 
HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HAssE, MENTAL DISABILmES AND CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 117-33 {1979) {addressing the relationship between traditional understand· 
ings of free will and the relevance of mental state to criminal responsibility); H.L.A. HART, 
PuN!SHMBNT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 90-112 {1968) 
(describing and critiquing traditional legal/moral understandings of individual responsibility); 
and JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE {1985) 
{describing behavioral causes and explanations for crinie). Shorter works are far too numer­
ous to list, but among the most relevant are Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 
Wis. L. REv. 1931 {1992) (arguing that "contemporary societies still lack a coherent deonto­
logical justification for the social practices that go by the name of punishment "); Richard 
Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of 
Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & lNEo. J. 9, 24-37 {1985) {describing the way in 
August 1999] Courage 2403 
problem remains, and is likely to remain for the foreseeable future, 
unresolved.40 Nor do I weigh in on any of the myriad disputes, 
within substantive criminal law, that implicate the consequent ten­
sion and uncertainty. Instead, my aim is to consider whether, and 
to what extent, we as a community are willing to confront and ac­
knowledge our own personal responsibility for the difficult and per­
plexing decisions that an ongoing commitment to the idea of 
personal responsibility requires us to make. My concern here is not 
so much with how well we resolve the problem of free will as with 
how nobly we confront it. 
Consider the terrible act of convicting a man of a crime and sen­
tencing him to prison. We know that there are facts about that 
man's life - his background, childhood, or genetic makeup -
which, if we could understand them fully, would explain his actions. 
But to explain is not to excuse; and so we convict. As we should. 
We have good and sufficient justifications for holding people re­
sponsible for their actions, justifications which need not hinge on 
any naive or oversimplified view of free will. We recognize, among 
other things, the need for deterrence and the need to protect our­
selves from predation, however explainable. When I describe the 
act of convicting a fellow human being as terrible, I do not mean 
that it is necessarily wrong. Even if it is right in a given case, fully 
justified under the best moral reasoning, it remains disturbing. We 
which a poor environment contributes to the development of criminal behavior); Deborah 
W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. 
L. RE.v. 615 {1988) (exploring the tension between individual freedom and social protection 
or responsibility in assessing culpability based on biological defenses); Patricia J. Falk, Novel 
Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment Urban 
Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. RE.v. 731, 733-74 (1996) (argu­
ing that, unlike short-term causal explanations for criminal behavior, novel extensions pro­
vide otherwise unavailable insight into criminal behavior); Carl Goldberg, The Reality of 
Human Will: A Concept Worth Reviving, 7 PsYCinATRIC ANNALS 566 {1977) (reviewing the 
history of the idea of will in modem thought); Lenn E. Goodman, Determinism and Freedom 
in Spinoza, Maimonides, and Aristotle: A Retrospective Study, in RE.sPONSIBILITY, CHARAC­
TER, AND TiiE EMOTIONS: NEW ARTICLES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 107 (Ferdinand Schoe­
man ed., 1987); Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts 
and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. RE.v. 971 (1982); and Ronald J. Rychlak & Joseph F. 
Rychlak, Mental Health Experts on Trial: Free Will and Determinism in the Courtroom, 100 
W. VA. L. RE.v. 193, 195 (1997) (arguing that courts must "demand that psychological and 
psychiatric expert witnesses function within the [free will based] assumptions of the legal 
system"). 
40. This should not be understood as a claim that the problem of free will is unamenable 
to moral, religious, or philosophical discourse. Much less do I suggest that attempts to ad­
dress the problem are futile. On the contrary, as I discuss below, one of the reasons I con­
sider it important for us as a community to confront and come to terms with our agency in 
perplexing decisions - meaning here those decisions which implicate our uncertainty over 
the idea of free will - is that doing so will keep the pressure on us to work for better and 
fairer ways of resolving or dealing with that tension, in general and in its specific substantive 
manifestations. 
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say to a fellow human being, in effect: "We know that each of us, if 
born as you were born and faced with what you have faced, may 
well have done as you have done. And yet we will judge you. We 
will imprison you for ten years, or for twenty, because it is you, and 
not us, who has come to be the person you are and to do the thing 
you have done." 
Liberalism, or, more specifically, a combination of democracy 
and the rule of law, offers a partial response to the problem of judg­
ment. By seeking to ground our laws in popular consent, and by 
working toward a regime in which all citizens have equal input into 
the content of those laws, we increase the extent to which any given 
individual judged under those laws may be said to have judged him­
self or herself. In addition, we strive to couch our laws in general 
terms - applicable equally to all citizens - with the aim being that 
the law itself, rather than individual men and women, will sit in 
judgment. 
I embrace the attempt to reduce the extent to which people are 
required, or permitted, to sit in judgment on one another. But the 
project is and will remain incomplete. However full and equal the 
political input, only unanimity would allow us to say that to be 
judged under the law is merely to judge oneself. And the idea of 
general laws is a legitimating principle, not a literal description. 
Laws equally applicable on their face impact some people and not 
others. Moreover, unless laws are generated from behind a 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance, those who make or approve laws will be 
aware of those differential impacts.41 In addition, however success­
ful we may be at reducing opportunities for arbitrariness, no regime 
can eliminate entirely the exercise of discretion in the enforcement 
phase of the criminal justice system. 
The upshot is that we as a community must judge and, on oc­
casion, condemn our fellow citizens. If we are thoughtful people, 
aware that there but for the grace of God go we, the obligation to 
play God in this way should disturb and discomfit us, however justi­
fied we are in doing so. Granted, then, that we should judge as 
fairly, legitimately, and uniformly as possible, one question remains. 
Do we do so bravely and honestly - by designing and maintaining 
structures and processes which force us to acknowledge as fully as 
possible our agency in the act of condemnation? Or, do we hide 
behind a regime of facially neutral procedures in an effort to wash 
our hands of responsibility for the fate of those we condemn? 
41. See Jo.HN RAwr.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 19 (1971). 
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Thomas Green has suggested that the jury might play an ongo­
ing role in moderating the tension generated by our uncertainty re­
garding free will and criminal responsibility.42 In this article I 
follow up on that suggestion. I argue, however, not that the jury 
serves as a means of moderating this tension, in the sense of avoid­
ing it, or of rendering the troubling act of judgment less difficult or 
more palatable. On the contrary, I suggest that the jury serves as a 
means of confronting this tension - of ensuring that it remains dif­
ficult and does not become more palatable. 
Here it is important to distinguish between what makes judg­
ment troubling and what makes it difficult. I do not argue that the 
act of judgment is difficult primarily because it is morally problem­
atic. As described below, jurors often do find it difficult to bring in 
a conviction. And no doubt in some of those cases at least part of 
the difficulty may stem from the jurors' underlying uncertainty re­
garding the idea of personal responsibility. However, it appears 
that jurors find it difficult to convict even when they are fully con­
vinced that a conviction is justified. My claim is that the morally 
troubling nature of judgment makes it important for us to confront 
our responsibility for the judgments we make, despite the fact that it 
may be difficult to do so. 
If the polity were small (or if the criminal justice system had 
access to unlimited resources), and if all that mattered about the 
system were the extent to which we as a community confront our 
agency in it, we might aim to design a system in which all or a sub­
stantial portion of the community were involved in each act of con­
demnation - in which each of us had to look into the eyes of each 
of those we judged. But resources are far from unlimited. And I 
readily acknowledge that the conscience-implicating function I de­
scribe is far from all we care about. We need a criminal justice sys­
tem that is workable. We need a system that will, with limited 
resources, achieve its substantive ends as well and fairly as possible, 
whether those aims be deterrence, debilitation, rehabilitation, or 
even retribution. I acknowledge as well that these ends might often 
best be served through the reduction of individual agency in the 
system. 
If, therefore, we want to avoid the ignobility of anonymous con­
demnation, we might design a system in which at least some of us 
were forced to acknowledge what we do. We might take turns. We 
might seek structures though which some number of us, drawn, per-
42. See GREEN, supra note 37. 
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haps, from as wide as possible cross-section of the community, were 
forced to look each defendant in the eyes. How many of us? 
Twelve might be as good a number as any. The jury is one of the 
places - one of the few places - where each of us is asked to take 
a turn facing up to what it is that we as a community are required to 
do. Jurors stand in for the community not only as decisionmakers, 
but also as responsibility takers. 
Contrast my argument with that made two decades ago by 
Guido Calabresi.43 Calabresi focused on the civil jury and argued 
that it is just the sort of institution that ought to be employed in 
making choices of the sort which I have described as perplexities, 
and which he terms tragic choices - decisions as to which one of 
the available alternatives appear morally unproblematic. As an ex­
ample, Calabresi cites the allocation of limited medical resources, 
such as kidney dialysis machines, "[which] compels a tragic choice 
because the assignment of the machine to one patient necessarily 
implies the otherwise unacceptable decision to allow other patients 
to die from renal failure."44 According to Calabresi, 
The jury's representativeness and lack of responsibility [which] have 
at times been identified as the reason why certain decisions are com­
mitted to it . . .  [are] the source of the characteristic and powerful way 
in which the jury operates. Juries apply societal standards without 
ever telling us what those standards are, or even that they exist. This 
is especially important in those situations in which the statement of 
standards would be terribly destructive.45 
Initially, Calabresi's primary example seems a poor fit with the 
actual work done by civil juries. As George Priest has noted, the 
allocation of limited medical resources is not in fact entrusted to 
civil juries, which adjudicate relatively few matters that could be 
described as tragic choices. 46 One might, however, apply 
Calabresi's claim with more effect to the criminal jury, which, as I 
have suggested, faces a "tragic choice" each time it brings in a con­
viction. In the criminal context, Calabresi's argument, or one quite 
similar, has a distinguished pedigree. Montesquieu couched it as 
follows: 
The power of judging should not be given to a permanent senate but 
should be exercised by persons drawn from the body of the people . . .  
In this fashion the power of judging, so terrible among men, being 
43. See CALABRESI & BoBBrIT, supra note 31. 
44. George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. 
Cm. LEGAL F. 161, 168 (citing CALABRESI & BoBBrIT, supra note 31, at 186-89). 
45. CALABRESI & BoBBrIT, supra note 31, at 57 (citations omitted). 
46. See Priest, supra note 44, at 168-69. 
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attached neither to a certain state nor to a certain profession, be­
comes, so to speak, invisible and null. Judges are not continually in 
view; one fears the magistracy, not the magistrates.47 
Juries, on this reading, take the sting out of difficult judgments by 
preventing the people from fixing responsibility for those judg­
ments on any specific agent or institution of government.48 I sug­
gest, to the contrary, that juries help keep the sting in difficult 
judgments by ensuring that at least some of us will be unable to 
avoid fixing responsibility on ourselves. 
The judging of our fellow citizens is of course only one of many 
perplexing decisions a community must make. As Calabresi sug­
gests, the allocation of limited resources can also give rise to situa­
tions in which none of the available options seems unambiguously 
correct. 49 Along lines more closely related to those traced in this 
article, Markus Dubber has described the American system of capi­
tal punishment as "a complex system of denying and dispersing re­
sponsibility for the infliction of pain."50 In Dubber's view, a 
collective inability to justify or come to terms with the infliction, as 
opposed to the threat, of death as a criminal sanction manifests it­
self in a "mad and futile scramble to deny personal responsibility 
for the necessarily violent aspect of law."51 The process represents 
a modem and sophisticated version of allowing one member of the 
firing squad to fire a blank. Dubber objects to these evasions and 
argues that each participant in the capital punishment process, from 
legislator to judge to jury to governor to prison official, should be 
encouraged to feel a greater sense of agency in making substantive 
choices about the infliction of death.52 His implication appears to 
be that a greater willingness to confront the reality of capital pun­
ishment would render us as a community less willing to impose it. 
47. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 158 {Anne M. Cobler et al. eds. & trans., 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 1989) (1748). 
48. Charles Clark, speaking of civil juries, and of the governmental agents most likely to 
bear the brunt of that responsibility, observed that jury decisionmaking "relieves the judges 
of the burden and the odium of deciding close questions of fact in cases, such as personal 
injury actions, where the feelings of the litigants are apt to run high." Charles E. Clark, 
Co=ent, Union of Law and Equity and Trial by Jury Under the Codes, 32 YALE L.J. 707, 
711 {1923). Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel similarly listed, among the "collateral advan­
tages" of the jury system, that juries serve as a "lightning rod for animosity and suspicion 
which otherwise might center on the more permanent judge . . . •  " See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, 
supra note 4, at 7. 
49. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 31, at 18-19. 
50. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 545, 545 {1996). 
51. Id. at 605-06. 
52. See id. at 608-11. 
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I am unconvinced by Dubber's implication that an unwillingness 
to confront the reality of a practice reveals a belief that that prac­
tice is unjustifiable. As I argue below, it can be hard to face what 
one must do even when one is truly convinced that it ought to be 
done. Moreover, his prescription - that everyone in the process 
be encouraged to feel agency - is doomed to failure. Responsibil­
ity, I argue, requires a fixed locus; and for the reasons I suggest, the 
jury would appear to be the best candidate. Dubber is on the mark, 
however, when he describes the way in which our current system 
facilitates the denial and shifting of personal responsibility for the 
actual infliction of the death penalty. In this light, one might argue 
that a truly courageous community would confront and acknowl­
edge agency in all of its tragic choices and troubling actions. I focus 
on the perplexity inherent in assigning criminal responsibility; but 
why stop there? Perhaps we should require some individual or 
group of individuals to sign their names to decisions allocating or­
gan transplants. Perhaps we should not allow any executioner to 
fire a blank. In a sense, however, the assignment of criminal re­
sponsibility is unique. Unlike allocation decisions, and unlike even 
the infliction of pain or death - both of which may be under some 
circumstances more troubling than the fixing of blame - the act of 
judgment itself presupposes a commitment to the idea of personal 
responsibility. It would seem particularly ignoble, not to mention 
hypocritical, to assign personal responsibility while at the same time 
denying any personal responsibility for that assignment. It may be 
too much to ask that we confront, and judge ourselves, for every 
difficult thing we do, but we should at least be willing to judge our­
selves for our judgements. 
B. The Expression of Courage 
Insofar as it may be helpful to put a name to the quality we 
might hope to express through a willingness to confront the per­
plexity of judgment, the term courage seems to me apt. It will be 
objected that courage means different things to different people 
and that labelling something or someone as courageous or cowardly 
represents a conclusion rather than an argument. Describing a 
practice as brave, one might object, simply does not prove anything 
about whether that practice is a good idea. I agree. I use "courage" 
to refer narrowly to a particular trait which seems to me admirable 
- the willingness to confront and acknowledge agency in what one 
finds necessary to do. Accordingly, my argument does not hinge on 
whether or not "courage" is the appropriate label for that trait, 
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though it seems to me fitting. Instead, my argument hinges on the 
question of whether that trait, that willingness, is in fact admirable. 
This sort of argument, I readily acknowledge, admits of no 
proof. I can no more prove a quality admirable than I can prove a 
symphony beautiful or a landscape sublime.53 The question, in the 
end, is what kind of people we want to be. And this question, while 
an appropriate subject of argument, cannot be an object of proof. 
All I can do is describe the sort of courage I suggest we might care 
about, and contrast it with the sort of cowardice we might want to 
eschew. 
In the spirit, therefore, of illustration rather than demonstration, 
permit me an imperfect analogy. Parents sometimes find it neces­
sary to punish or discipline their children. Some might use "time 
outs," or the denial of certain privileges, or grounding, or even 
spanking; but some form of discipline seems an inescapable if un­
fortunate aspect of rearing responsible children. Now, imagine if it 
were possible to delegate that responsibility entirely, not just par­
tially as we do when we send our children to school. Imagine a new 
service, whereby parents could distance themselves entirely from 
the act of discipline by paying the service to monitor their children's 
behavior and administer appropriate punishment. Parents could 
choose what sort of behavior to punish, how to punish it, and how 
severely, but the service would do the rest. Imagine further that the 
service, by virtue of the expert training and emotional detachment 
of its employees, would do a better job than parents. It would 
never be fooled, never make a mistake, and, unlike parents, never 
punish too mildly out of weakness or too severely out of frustration 
or anger. 
I suggest that many of us would choose not to employ such a 
service were it available. Many of us would consider it important to 
discipline our own children, even if we are unable to do so as ef­
ficiently (or even as fairly) as might be possible through some sort 
53. The analogy to aesthetics is imperfect but potentially illustrative, given the way in 
which arguments about the social meaning or expressive content of public practices can be 
dismissed as irreducibly subjective - "just a matter of taste." It is a matter of taste, but it 
need not be "just" that An inability to agree upon a definition of beauty has not prevented 
people from talking and arguing about it. Moreover, it is at least possible that an aesthetic 
approach may provide a way of addressing or grounding discussion of troubling normative 
issues. By learning to talk about bravery and beauty, we may better learn how to talk about 
right or wrong. Kant's final work is an attempt in the direction of just such a moral aesthetic. 
See DIETER HENRICH, AEsrHEnc JUDGMENT AND TIIB MoRAL !MAGE OF TIIB WoRLD: 
STUDIES IN KANT 29-56 (1992); lMMANuEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (James 
Creed Meredith trans., Clarendon Press 1952) (1790). 
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of delegation. Punishing our children, however necessary, ought to 
hurt us more than it hurts them. 
The analogy to the family is imperfect for a number of reasons, 
not the least of which is that the sense of personal attachment and 
obligation one feels to one's own children is qualitatively different 
from that which one is likely to feel toward fellow citizens of the 
polity. Again, analogies of this sort illustrate rather than prove. In 
this case, the analogy at least suggests, or so I hope, that there are 
some actions which we would not be willing to pay someone else to 
do for us. I further suggest, and this is the unprovable part, we have 
a term for someone who would hide from the unpleasant necessity 
of disciplining his or her own children by delegating that responsi­
bility. The term is "coward." 
To reiterate, my goal here in this subpart is merely to illustrate 
what I mean by courage. If, through examples of this sort, I can 
capture or give a sense of the quality I suggest may be expressed 
through a willingness to use juries in criminal trials, I will have done 
all I can. It is not for me ultimately to say whether this quality, 
once described, is in fact worth having or expressing. That depends 
on what kind of people we want to be. What I do maintain, how­
ever, here and throughout the remainder of this article, is that if we 
consider this form of courage and forthrightness worth cultivating 
and expressing, the criminal trial jury is an institution well suited to 
that expression. 
Before returning, however, to the question of how and why the 
jury might be understood to symbolize this form of courage, con­
sider an alternative analogy designed to flesh out further the nature 
of the quality itself. This analogy is drawn from the world of busi­
ness, where the personal bond, which makes the family example of 
limited application, cannot be presumed. Suppose you run a busi­
ness, employing sales representatives, and that you have established 
certain bare minimum performance standards for your employees. 
In line with those standards, you have determined conditions under 
which an employee should be fired - that a certain combination of 
performance failures or misbehavior should lead to termination. If, 
for example, an employee is late for work more than ten times in 
one quarter, and fails to meet sales quotas for six straight months, 
and has unsatisfactory performance evaluations from his or her su­
pervisor for four consecutive quarters, then, according to your pol­
icy, that employee is to be fired. In order to be completely fair, you 
make sure all employees are fully familiar with the standards - the 
policy is described in the employee handbook as the "firing line." 
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In addition, you provide training, counseling, and other assistance 
to employees who seem to be in danger. All in all, you have no 
doubt that you do in fact want to let go any employee who fails to 
meet these minimal requirements and that you are fully justified in 
doing so. 
Now, suppose your software vender describes to you a new and 
inexpensive program. The program will collect data from account­
ing, personnel, and sales, and will determine if and when any em­
ployee has crossed the "firing line." In addition, the program can 
be designed actually to do the deed. Firing a person, as anyone who 
has had to do it knows, is an unpleasant experience. The program 
could take you off the hook. Once an employee meets the condi­
tions for termination, the computer would issue and mail a sever­
ance check, freeze the employee's access to company records, and 
cancel his or her corporate credit card. The computer would also 
generate a polite email message informing the employee that he or 
she has been terminated and instructing the employee to clean out 
his or her desk. Would you make use of that program? Or would 
you feel an obligation to look the employee in the eye and deliver 
the news yourself? More to the point, what would it say about you 
and your operation to make use of that program to avoid having to 
confront the person you have decided to fire? Is this the kind of 
operation you would want to work for, let alone design? 
Although I do not mean for my argument to tum on whether or 
not courage is the best label for the characteristic or trait poten­
tially expressed by a decision to put the act of judgment into the 
hands of juries, the term does offer a way of distinguishing between 
several related and overlapping qualities which might go under that 
name, only some of which I believe are plausibly symbolized by the 
use of criminal trial juries. One sort of courage would be a willing­
ness to act, in specific cases, in a way consistent with principles we 
as a community purport to define ourselves by. For example, if we 
stand for, or purport to stand for, a certain vision of free speech, 
perhaps we should have the courage to stand by that commitment 
even in cases where the speech in question is of a form we dislike or 
would prefer to live without. Although this is the form of courage 
which might be initially suggested by the title of this article, it is not 
my focus here. I do not argue that using juries symbolizes a willing­
ness to apply general principles to specific cases. On the contrary, 
and as I acknowledge below, the use of juries may come at some 
cost to this type of consistency with principles. 
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Instead, my claim is that the use of juries may be understood to 
express a willingness to do two things: first, to confront the specific 
consequences of whatever we decide to do; and second, to acknowl­
edge our own agency in and responsibility for bringing about those 
consequences. The form of courage I refer to is not a willingness to 
act in this way or that, but rather a willingness to stand behind 
whatever actions we take. Perhaps one might choose another label 
for this quality: forthrightness, honor, frankness, or nobility come 
to mind as possibilities. In any event, the focus here is less on act­
ing rightly than on taking responsibility for actions. The opposite of 
courage, as I am using the term, is not hypocrisy but cowardice. 
In the end, if one believes that taking responsibility for one's 
difficult decisions is unimportant - that this form of courage is not 
worth having or displaying - then this part of my argument will fall 
on deaf ears. By arguing that a willingness to acknowledge agency 
in judgments is admirable and by using the language of courage to 
flesh out that claim, I do, not appeal to or assume the presence of an 
unambiguous preexisting shared understanding of courage or cow­
ardice. Rather, this article represents an effort to contribute to and 
participate in the ongoing effort to construct such an understanding. 
C. Consequentialist Arguments 
Although I have insisted that social meaning matters for its own 
sake, and that we as a community might prefer to behave bravely 
simply because we prefer to understand ourselves as brave, I am 
not a purist on the point. Given the extent to which objections to 
my concrete recommendations are likely to be of a consequentialist 
nature, it is worth noting that there are instrumental arguments for 
my position. I hesitate in making these arguments, however, out of 
fear that my overall claim will be understood to hinge upon them. 
It does not. Making instrumental arguments against cowardice is 
like arguing that one should not spit on one's mother because it 
spreads germs. It may do that, but to highlight that fact risks mis­
sing the point. With that caveat, however, I am willing to offer 
three consequentialist arguments for confronting the perplexity of 
judgment - for implicating the conscience of as many of us as pos­
sible when judging our fellow citizens. 
First, and most concretely, we might make fairer laws to the ex­
tent that we know that we, or at least some of us, will have to ac­
knowledge responsibility for the particular human consequences of 
those laws. In a sense, this is a variation of the argument tradition­
ally made on behalf of jury nullification. The traditional claim is 
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that juries protect citizens from the State and mitigate the harsh 
and potentially unfair particular consequences of general laws by 
occasionally exercising their power to nullify.54 My claim, however, 
is somewhat different. I suggest that our awareness that we will 
have to confront the human consequences of our laws might cause 
us to make those laws more fair in the first place. 
To the extent that lawmakers, and those who · vote for 
lawmakers, understand themselves as potential jurors, this ex ante 
deterrence function (deterring, in this case, lawmakers rather than 
lawbreakers), might function directly: "Do not support a law im­
posing a given criminal sanction unless you are willing to look a 
man in the eye and impose that sanction." Given, however, that 
most of those who support or vote for a given law will not antici­
pate having to enforce that particular law themselves, the effect is 
likely to be more indirect: "Do not support a law imposing a given 
sanction unless you believe that twelve of your fellow citizens will 
be able to look a man in the eye and impose it." 
A second instrumental argument, albeit one closely related to 
the first, might go under the heading of moral or political cost­
intemalization. Assume we make our laws as fair as possible; they 
will still give rise to troubling consequences. Social and economic 
realities, coupled with human frailty, will continue to give rise to 
criminal behavior. That behavior, in tum, will continue to need to 
be punished, deterred, and protected against through criminal sanc­
tions. To the extent that we force ourselves to be troubled and dis­
comforted by the necessity of imposing those sanctions, we may be 
motivated to work towards eliminating or abating the conditions 
which contribute to criminal behavior. Dysfunctional families, drug 
addiction, ravaged neighborhoods, poor schools, racism, and pov­
erty (moral and economic) should trouble us primarily because of 
what they do to our fellow citizens. Perhaps we should also be trou­
bled, and motivated, by what they make us do to our fellow citizens. 
It might appear that fear of crime itself ought to motivate a 
community to mitigate the social and economic circumstances giv­
ing rise to that crime. Why should one expect that the discomfort 
inherent in imposing punishment will serve any additional motivat­
ing function? If people will not work for social change in order to 
prevent crime, why would they work for social change in order to 
avoid having to punish criminals? Two reasons: For one, the 
54. See infra sections III.D & IV.D (outlining the arguments surrounding the question of 
jury nullification and situating my overall thesis within those arguments). 
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classes of potential jurors and potential crime victims are not neces­
sarily congruent. Not only do criminals emerge primarily from and 
inhabit the low end of the socioeconomic spectrum, so too do crime 
victims.55 Granted, the rich fear crime, and see themselves as po­
tential victims, but they are also able to devise ways of protecting 
themselves. Those who are most free from deprivation are also 
able to shield themselves from much of the criminal behavior gen­
erated by that deprivation.56 Build a high enough wall, and it may 
be possible to avoid confronting either crime or the underlying so­
cial conditions which contribute to it. For some, jury service may 
provide a rare opportunity, albeit an unwanted one, to look closely 
at what lies on the other side of the gate. 
More to the point, juries are forced to look at particular 
criminals rather than at crime in general.57 Knowing about and 
fearing crime, even being a victim of crime, however painful and 
disturbing that may be, can allow one to retain a sense of righteous­
ness. Having to decide that a man or woman will spend the next 
twenty years in prison is different - it implicates one in the system. 
It dirties one in a way that being a victim or potential victim does 
not. 
· 
In addition, jurors must confront the individual who has come to 
be a criminal. They see at close quarters the man or woman whose 
life need not have taken this course. Assume they are fully justified 
in bringing in a conviction and that they do so. Assume that they 
have no doubts about the necessity of judging as they have. They 
may still come to wish for a world in which the thing they have done 
is less often necessary. The strength of this argument depends upon 
55. For example, people in families with annual incomes less than $7500 experience a 
crime victimization rate of 89.5 per 1000. By contrast, those with annual incomes over 
$75,000 experience a crime victimization rate of 38.2 per 1000. See URIE BRONFENBRENNER 
ET AL., THE STATE OF AMERICANS: THE DISTURBING FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHANGING 
VALUES, CRIME, THE EcoNoMY, POVERTY, FAMILY, EDUCATION, THE AGING POPULATION 
AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR OuR FUTURE 22 fig. 1-17 (1996), cited in Peter M. Cicchino, 
The Problem Child: An Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in the 
United States, 5 J.L. & POLY. 5, 28 (1996); see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce­
ment Act of 1994, H.R. REP. No. 103-324 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1804 
("The impact [of violent crime] is particularly harsh in poorer communities, many of which 
are literally being destroyed by violence . . • .  "); CHARLES MURRAY, LosING GROUND: 
AMERICAN SOCIAL PouCY, 1950-1980, at 119-20 (1984). 
56. See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA (1997) 
(describing the ways in which the well-off seek to protect themselves from crime methods, 
including hiring private security, living in closed or walled-off neighborhoods, installing 
alarms or other security devices, and insuring valuables). 
57. As the United States Supreme Court has observed in the context of capital sentenc­
ing, the jury is required to focus on the defendant as a "uniquely individual human being." 
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
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the extent to which juries are truly representative and provides an 
argument for ensuring that jurors are drawn from a true cross­
section of the community. 
Finally, and most long term, is an argument situated at the place 
where consequentialist concerns meet claims of social meaning. If 
we allow ourselves to become a cowardly people - if we begin to 
deal with perplexities by hiding from them - what will we allow 
ourselves to do next? Granted that judging and punishing criminals 
as we do is pragmatically necessary and morally justified, there is no 
guarantee that our future public acts will be equally laudable. His­
tory has shown what can be done by people who do not feel agency 
in their actions - who understand themselves as merely playing a 
role in a larger system, or just following orders. If we get into the 
habit of ducking responsibility for our tragic choices, or get used to 
delegating them to people who know not what they do, it becomes 
increasingly likely that we will allow ourselves to take that small but 
terrible step from cowardice to cruelty. 
D. Meanings and Consequences 
Having offered a set of consequentialist arguments for asking 
the jury to play a responsibility-taking role, I readily acknowledge 
that there may be attendant risks. The most obvious risk may be 
that of nullification. By nullification I refer, here and throughout 
this article, to a decision on the part of a jury to acquit a defendant 
despite believing that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.58 
One possible risk attendant on asking that each of us take a turn 
looking defendants in the eye is that occasionally we will blink. 
Those of us called upon to embody the community and to acknowl­
edge our agency in judgments of culpability will sometimes shrink 
from the task. In section IV.D below, I return to the issue of jury 
nullification, and to the question of whether recognizing the jury's 
responsibility-taking function might shed light on the uncertain 
legal status of nullification. Here, however, let me make the pre­
liminary and simplifying assumption that nullification is simply un-
58. I recognize that one might use the term nullification more broadly to refer to any 
decision by a jury to disregard the law. In the criminal context, for example, a jury might 
convict despite believing a defendant to be innocent of the crime charged. It is this sort of 
"nullification" against which rules excluding prejudicial evidence are intended to guard. See, 
e.g., FED. R. Evm. 404(a) (excluding evidence of "character or a trait of character . • .  for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith"). I focus on the question of nullification 
acquittal not because I believe that nullification convictions are unproblematic. On the con­
trary, I assume that it is always a bad thing to convict an innocent defendant. The question 
that generates impassioned debate is whether we should tolerate, or even encourage, the 
occasional acquittal of an guilty defendant. 
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desirable. I make this assumption not because I believe that it is 
necessarily correct, but rather because my goal here is to acknowl­
edge the risks potentially attendant upon making jurors aware of 
their responsibility for and agency in criminal convictions. Nullifi­
cation is a risk only to those who believe it to be a bad thing. The 
question, therefore, is how we might think about the intersection 
between that clearly identifiable (if difficult to quantify) risk, on the 
one hand, and the inchoate social meaning potentially expressed by 
encouraging juror responsibility, on the other. 
In framing this question, it seems safe to make a further assump­
tion that, however important we consider the expression of cour­
age, we would not desire to increase juror's sense of responsibility 
beyond the point of reason. So, in outlining below the ways in 
which that sense of responsibility might be enforced or engendered, 
I do not recommend extreme or bizarre measures. For example, I 
do not suggest that jurors be required to pay daily visits to the fami­
lies of those they have convicted. I do not suggest that jurors be 
required to visit or correspond regularly with those they have sent 
to prison. I do not suggest that capital juries be required to attend 
or preside at executions. While steps such as these would certainly 
engender a sense of responsibility and would certainly fix the con­
sciences (in the retrospective sense) of jurors, such measures would 
with equal certainty inhibit the ability of jurors to bring in convic­
tions when warranted. 
The question, therefore, is how to evaluate the risks which 
might attend the more modest measures described below. And that 
only experience can tell. The risks may not, however, be as great as 
might first appear. As an initial matter, cases of actual nullification 
are arguably quite rare. Opponents of nullification, particularly in 
the popular press, often argue anecdotally, pointing to certain high 
profile verdicts such as the O.J. Simpson criminal verdict as evi­
dence that "jury nullification is undermining our system of jus­
tice. "59 One academic has gone so far as to describe the United 
States as "in an age of radical and frequent acts of criminal jury 
nullification."60 I have located no evidence in support of these dire 
descriptions. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how one might mea­
sure the rate of nullification. As Judge Weinstein has pointed out, 
59. Daniel Levine, Race Over Reason in the Jury Box, READERS DIGEST, June 1996, at 
123. 
60. Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substantially 
Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary Blueprint for Re· 
modeling Our National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate System of Federal Crim· 
inal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 535, 609-10 (1996). 
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distinguishing "between a 'right' outcome - a verdict following the 
letter of the law - and a 'wrong' one - a 'nullification' verdict -
can be dangerous, and this endeavor depends largely upon personal 
bias."61 In addition, not every "wrong" verdict represents a case of 
nullification. One must distinguish, for example, cases in which ju­
ries doubt the credibility of state witnesses whose testimony on its 
face appears to support a conviction. Mistrust of the police may be 
troubling, but it is not the same thing as disrespect for the law. Sim­
ilarly, one must distinguish cases in which juries are simply mis­
taken, or confused, rather than defiant. 
Moreover, it is not at all clear that making juries aware of their 
role in embodying community conscience would increase the likeli­
hood of an acquittal. As described below, prosecutors know how to 
exhort juries to their duty. Recognizing the possibility of nullifica­
tion, prosecutors have developed a repertoire of arguments 
designed to achieve just that end.62 We cannot know whether we, 
in our capacity as jurors, will be courageous unless and until we give 
ourselves the opportunity to display courage. 
Assume for the sake of argument, however, that we will not al­
ways be up to the task - that jurors will on occasion be unwilling 
to convict if forced to acknowledge agency in the conviction. As­
sume that convictions would decrease by 1 %,  or even 10%, which 
seems highly unlikely. And assume further that all of those addi­
tional acquittals would be unwarranted. What we as a community 
then need to decide is if that cost is worth paying. It is often de­
scribed as better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict even 
one innocent. We might similarly decide that it is better to convict 
65% of defendants bravely than to convict 70% by behaving as 
cowards. 
In deciding whether to accept some increase in unwarranted ac­
quittals, it is important to keep in mind that unwarranted acquittals 
themselves represent just a fraction of unpunished crimes. Before a 
defendant can be acquitted, he must become a defendant. The 
crime must be solved, the police must choose to make an arrest, and 
61. The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and 
Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 239 (1993). 
62. One of my personal favorites is the "summer soldier" argument, in which the prose­
cutor quotes Thomas Paine to the effect that no one needs "summer soldiers" who will only 
turn out in support of the community when the going is easy. Instead, the argument goes, we 
all need to take our turn doing the difficult and unpleasant work of citizenship. Interestingly, 
a version of this argument is described in a journal published by the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, in which defense lawyers are advised to exhort jurors not to be 
"summer soldiers and sunshine patriots in following the law of reasonable doubt." Ray 
Moses, The Last Word, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 51. 
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the State must elect to prosecute. As Albert Alschuler has noted, 
"[W]hen the discretion of prosecutors and other officials not to en­
force the law is not only tolerated but applauded, it is difficult to 
argue (as prosecutors, of all people, often do) that affording a dis­
pensing power to jurors would bring the rule of law to an end. "63 
Add to this the fact that the vast majority of defendants plead guilty 
or no contest, and that most of those who do go to trial are con­
victed, and the question of nullification comes into perspective. To 
the extent that jury nullification is a problem, it is arguably not be­
cause the already substantial number of unpunished crimes may 
thereby increase by some small increment. Rather nullification is 
potentially troubling because of what it means. 
Contrary to those who appear to believe that nullification, how­
ever rare, must be interpreted as disrespect for the law, I am unwil­
ling to draw any oversimplified conclusions as to the social meaning 
of nullification. It seems inescapable that juries that nullify do so 
for a variety of reasons. Some juries may simply be merciful. 
Others may believe that the defendant's actions should not be con­
sidered criminal at all. Other juries may nullify because they be­
lieve the attendant punishment (or what they are able to guess 
about the punishment) is out of proportion with the crime. As 
Thomas Green has detailed, nullification has a long, rich social his­
tory .64 A refusal to convict need not mean anarchy. 
To this I add that a willingness to risk such a refusal may itself 
be meaningful. It may mean not that we lack respect for the law, 
but that we have respect for ourselves - that we are willing to trust 
ourselves to have the courage to look into the eyes of those we are 
forced to judge. 
What this further suggests is that the question is not simply one 
of balancing material costs against inchoate meanings. The matter 
is more complicated. Perhaps, for example, some material costs are 
necessary for an action to be meaningful. Perhaps an effective ex­
pression of courage, honor, or other aspect of community identity 
requires that we demonstrate, rather than merely announce, our 
commitment to that self-description. It is hard for an act that costs 
one nothing to stand for much more. 
63. Albert W. Alschuler, A Teetering Palladium?, 79 JUDICATURE 200, 201 (1996) (re­
viewing STEVEN ADLER, THE JuRY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN CouRTROOM 
(1994) and JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DE· 
MOCRACY (1994)). 
64. See Green, supra note 9. 
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Accordingly, in thinking about the manifestations of juror re­
sponsibility described in Part IV below, and the recommendations 
for engendering juror responsibility in Part V, it should not only be 
asked whether the risks imposed by these measures are too great a 
cost to pay for the expression of courage. It should be asked as well 
whether the costs imposed by these measures are large enough to 
allow them to carry that expressive content. 
IV. MANIF'EsTATIONS OF JURY REsPONSIBILITY 
If the jury does in fact perform the role I ascribe to it, one would 
expect to find that role reflected in the practices and procedures 
governing the criminal jury trial. I do not maintain that this func­
tion has been explicitly delineated through the case law and rules 
surrounding the j ury trial. On the contrary, the jury's  
responsibility-taking function has not been expressly described or 
defended, and for that reason has gone unappreciated. I do main­
tain, however, that aspects of the procedural and evidentiary struc­
ture surrounding the jury, as well as aspects of the language 
employed by courts in maintaining that structure, make more sense 
if understood as informed by an awareness that the jury does and 
should perform this function. 
I use the phrase "informed by an awareness" rather than "moti­
vated by an intention" because I am not making a, strong claim 
about the conscious intent or motivation of the many judges, law­
yers, and litigants who have contributed to the evolution of the 
criminal justice system. As Charles Nesson has observed: 
Rules that evolved without conscious design may now serve impor­
tant objectives that are not consciously appreciated. The evolving 
pattern of the system may thus shed light on its underlying values; 
inversely, the positing of such values may help to explain the existing 
structure of the system. 65 
Imagine a person who prides himself or herself on a neatly 
manicured lawn and a perfectly washed and waxed car. He or she 
might come to recognize that these tastes are in part manifestations 
of an underlying but not consciously appreciated desire for order. 
This realization might help that person better understand not only 
his or her attention to the lawn and car but also other seemingly 
unconnected aspects of his or her life. I suggest that aspects of the 
criminal jury trial are in part manifestations of an underlying but 
not consciously appreciated desire to preserve the j ury's 
responsibility-taking function. 
65. Nesson, supra note 4, at 1369. 
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In particular, four aspects of criminal jury trial practice can be 
illuminated in this way: the invocation of "conscience" in argu­
ments to and about juries, judicial concern that certain forms of 
evidence or testimony will "usurp the role of the jury," the doctrine 
of Caldwell v. Mississippi, and the continuing uncertainty over the 
legal and conceptual status of jury nullification. 
A. The Invocation of Conscience 
The jury is frequently referred to as the "conscience of the com­
munity," or variations on that theme. In many cases, this usage can 
be explained by reference to the jury's primary role as factfinder. I 
suggest, however, that the language of conscience is not fully expli­
cable by reference to the jury's traditionally recognized decision­
making function. In at least some cases it points to and reveals an 
implicit awareness of the responsibility-taking function ascribed to 
the jury in this article. The jury serves as the "conscience of the 
community" in that the jury is the institution through which we 
acknowledge and accept responsibility for our judgments - the in­
stitution through which our individual consciences are implicated in 
those judgments. 
The term "conscience" has a long history in connection with the 
institution of the criminal trial jury. In one early formulation of the 
reasonable doubt standard, for example, jurors were instructed to 
convict only "if the evidence is sufficient to satisfy your con­
science. "66 As Barbara Shapiro has demonstrated, the "satisfied 
conscience" language was common in seventeenth- and eighteenth­
century criminal jury instructions.67 Shapiro has argued that, his­
torically, this language should be understood as epistemological, ex­
pressing merely a belief that, with absolute certainty always out of 
reach, "[j]ury verdicts must be based on the very highest knowledge 
available to humans in matters of fact."68 Although I am unpre­
pared to challenge Shapiro's extensively documented historical 
claim, it does seem to me that something is lost by understanding 
references to conscience as nothing more than epistemological. 
66. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TiiE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 14 (1991) (cita­
tion omitted). 
67. See id. at 38. 
68. Id. at 27. Shapiro attributes this understanding in part to Locke's Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, see LoCKE, supra note 40, and its incorporation into legal doctrine in 
part, to early treatise writers such as Geoffrey Gilbert and John Morgan. Her overall claim is 
that the reasonable doubt standard and its precursors should be understood as a response to 
developments in epistemology that highlighted the pervasiveness of uncertainty in human 
knowledge. 
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And one need only glance at the OED to see the rich and varied 
etymology of the term. It is not my goal to trace that etymology, 
nor even to trace the history of the term in connection with the jury. 
Instead, the question is this: What does it mean, in the context of 
the modem jury trial, to say that juries function as the "conscience 
of the community"? 
In some cases, conscience appears to mean nothing more than 
common sense or sound judgment.69 References to the jury as the 
conscience of the community in such contexts do not ascribe any 
additional role to the jury beyond its traditional one as factfinder 
and judge of witness credibility. Similarly, substantive law under 
some circumstances incorporates a community standard. The most 
familiar example might be the negligence standard in tort, at least 
one understanding of which refers to the reasonableness of the de­
fendant's behavior in the eyes of the community. In this sense, 
when the jury is asked to "represent the feeling of the com­
munity ,"70 it is being asked for something like expert testimony. Ju­
rors are deemed the best authority on the behavior of "the ideal 
average prudent man, whose equivalent the jury is taken to be."71 
In such contexts, the term "conscience" might mean merely a 
"sense of what is considered appropriate or acceptable." This ap­
pears to be the manner in which the language of conscience is used 
69. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 560-61 (1992) (In a child pornogra­
phy case in which defendant claimed entrapment, "[i]t was, however, the jury's task, as the 
conscience of the community, to decide whether Mr. Jacobson was a willing participant in the 
criminal activity here or an innocent dupe."); Middleton v. Reynolds Metals Co., 963 F.2d 
881, 884 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The role of the jury in interpreting the evidence and finding the 
ultimate facts is an American tradition so fundamental as to merit constitutional recognition. 
The conscience of the community speaks through the verdict of the jury." (quoting Horton v. 
Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Ky. 1985))); United States v. Dwyer, 
843 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Confidence in our jury system leads us to leave credibility 
solely to the jury which, as the conscience of the community, is expected to act with sound 
judgment." (quoting United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 24 (2d Cir. 1979))). 
70. O.W. HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 111 (1881), reprinted in 3 THE CoLLECTED 
Woru<s OF JUSTICE HoLMES 109, 171 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995). 
71. Id.; see also, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court ex reL 
Brown, 927 P.2d 1260, 1278 (Cal. 1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("As the conscience of the 
community, the jury plays an essential role in the application of the reasonable person stan­
dard of care."); 'l\veedley v. 'l\veedley, 649 A.2d 630, 633 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) 
("The jury is the conscience of the community in tort cases, articulating and imposing mini­
mum standards of civilized behavior." (quoting Hutchings v. Hutchings, No. 05449S, 1993 
WL 57741, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993))). Consider, for example, the instruction 
approved four decades ago by the United States Supreme Court in a case upholding an ob­
scenity statute against a challenge that the statute was impermissibly vague: 
In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the exclusive judges 
of what the common conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience 
you are to consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, 
the religious and the irreligious - men, women and children. 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957). 
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in the death penalty context, where juries play a role (either final or 
advisory, depending upon the jurisdiction) in sentencing.72 
Where substantive law does not expressly incorporate a com­
munity standard, descriptions of the jury as the conscience of the 
community are more difficult to interpret. What role is the jury 
being asked to play? One such role is that of "defense against arbi­
trary law enforcement."73 Asking criminal trial juries to act as the 
conscience of the community might be a way of asking them to nul­
lify - to refuse to convict - if a particular application of the crimi­
nal law would offend community standards. In the words of the 
United States Supreme Court, "The availability of trial by jury al­
lows an accused to protect himself against possible oppression by 
what is in essence an appeal to the community conscience, as em­
bodied in the jury that hears his case."74 This seems also to be the 
implication of Judge Bazelon's oft-quoted assertion that "the very 
essence of the jury's function is its role as a spokesman for the com­
munity conscience in determining whether or not blame can be 
imposed. "75 
I return in section IV.D below, to the uncertain status of jury 
nullification, but for now it is sufficient to note that if usage is any 
guide, references to the jury as conscience cannot always be under­
stood to refer to nullification, or even lenity, given that the phrase is 
most often employed not by judges or by defense lawyers, but by 
prosecutors.76 Prosecutors regularly attempt, and are frequently 
permitted, to argue that the jury must serve as the "conscience of 
72. In the sentencing phase of the trial of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, the 
district court instructed the jury in part, 
Your role in this process is to be the conscience of the community in making a moral 
judgment about the worth of a specific life balanced against the societal value of what 
the government contends to be - or is the deserved punishment for these particular 
crimes. Your decision must be a reasoned one free from the influence of passion, preju­
dice or any other arbitrary factor. 
United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1222 n.50 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 
1148 (1999); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (stating that the function of 
the sentencing jury is to "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question 
of life or death "). 
73. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
74. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554-55 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (holding that trial by jury in adjudicative stage of state juvenile 
court delinquency proceeding is not constitutionally required). 
75. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., con­
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
76. I have not examined the use of the language of conscience by defense lawyers in 
criminal cases. While such an investigation might well be interesting or illuminating, my goal 
here is merely to shed light on one potentially problematic use of the term conscience - that 
by prosecutors - rather than to catalogue or comment upon the full range of usage of the 
term. 
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the community."77 The courts attempt to distinguish between ex­
horting and inflaming. If the prosecutor's argument appears in­
tended to inflame the jury or to encourage the jury to convict in 
response to outside factors such as community expectations or de­
terrence unrelated to the particular defendant's guilt or innocence, 
the court will hold community conscience arguments improper.78 
If, on the other hand, the prosecutor appears only to be exhorting 
the jury to its duty, closing arguments using "conscience of the com­
munity" are generally permitted.79 
77. See, e.g., Uni ted S tates v. Alloway, 397 F.2d 105, 113 (6th Cir. 1968) (permitting pros­
ecutor to  argue to  jury that "[y]ou the jurors, are called upon i n  this case to  be the world 
conscience of the community. And I'm calling on this jury to speak out for the community 
and let the John Alloways know that this type of conduc t  will not be tolerated , that we're not 
going to tolerate"); Wilson v. S tate, 697 N.E.2d 466, 477 (Ind. 1998) (approving jury instruc­
t ion, tendered by prosecutor and given by the trial court i n  a noncapi tal murder case, that 
"[y]ou are further instructed that in determining the criminal responsibility of the D efendant, 
if any, that you are the moral conscience of our soc iety"); S tate v. Pat terson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 
446 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that prosecutor's reference to jury as "consc ience of 
the communi ty" was not improper). 
78. See, e.g., Uni ted S tates v. Ghazaleh, 58 F.3d 240, 246 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he type of 
appeal we have considered improper i s  one where the prosecutor urges the jury to  send a 
message to all drug dealers in the community by convicting the defendant."); Uni ted S tates v. 
Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that prosecutor's closing argument ex­
horting jurors to  act as a "bulwark" agai nst drug dealing was improper and inflammatory); 
Uni ted States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1148 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding i t  i mproperly inflam­
matory to exhort the jury " to  tell her and all of the other drug dealers like her - (defense 
counsel's objection and Court's response om i t ted) - [t]hat we don' t want that stuff in North­
ern Kentucky and that anybody who brings  that stuff in Northern Kentucky and . . ."); 
Coreas v. Uni ted S tates, 565 A.2d 594, 604 (D.C. 1989) ("Argument which encourages the 
jury to 'send a message' has been found improper . . . .  "); Powell v. Uni ted S tates, 455 A.2d 
405, 410 (D.C. 1982) (holding that the question " isn't i t  time that this jury, acting as the 
consci ence of this community, stood up and sent a message loud and clear to [the defend­
ant?]" was " i rrelevant and inappropriate"). In c ivil cases also, an appeal to  jurors to  be the 
conscience of the community will be found objectionable where i t  appears calculated to  focus 
the jury's attention on community expec tations rather than on the fai r  resolution of the case 
at hand. See, e.g., Westbrook v. General Trre & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam). 
79. See, e.g., Uni ted S tates v. D urbin, No. 96-30223, 1997 WL 464626, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 
7, 1997) ("A prosecutor's appeal to the jury to act as a 'consc ience of the communi ty' i s  
acceptable unless i t  i s  'specifically designed to  inflame the jury."' (quoting Uni ted S tates v. 
Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984))); United S tates v. Will iams, 989 F.2d 1061 , 1072 
(9th Cir. 1993); Uni ted S tates v. Smi th, 918 F.2d 1551, 1562-63 (11th Ci r. 1990) (holding that 
prosecutorial appeals to the jury to act as the communi ty conscience are perm issible "when 
they are not i ntended to inflame"); United S tates v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir. 
1976) ("Unless calculated to inflame, an appeal to the jury to ac t as the conscience of the 
community is not impermissible."); State v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 144, 156 (N.C. 1995) (hold­
ing it proper to urge the jury to ac t as the voice and conscience of the communi ty). Some 
courts, those in Massachuset ts, for example, have been less tolerant of prosecutorial "con­
sc ience of the community" arguments. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matthews, 581 N.E.2d 
1304, 1310 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) ("It was also inappropriate for the prosecutor to tell the 
jurors that they were 'the conscience of the communi ty.' They bear no such burden; thei r 
role i n  a trial is limited to finding the facts  on the basis of the evidence, d ispassionately and 
impartially."). Even there, however, the comments must be inflammatory in order to be 
objectionable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smi th, 444 N.E.2d 374 (Mass. 1983) (barri ng pros­
ecutor's words, which, i n  effec t, connoted that defendant "should not be let loose on soci-
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What do prosecutors mean when they ask jurors to act as the 
conscience of the community, given that they are certainly not ask­
ing for nullification? One explanation might be that they are asking 
for just the opposite. Just as defendants would, if permitted, ask 
juries to acquit "according to conscience" despite evidence support­
ing a conviction under the law, perhaps prosecutors are implicitly 
asking juries to convict according to community conscience - in 
response to community expectations, for example - not\vithstand­
ing any uncertainty regarding the guilt or innocence of the particu­
lar defendant. H so, such arguments would be improper not only 
under the case law described above, but also as a matter of basic 
fairness. H defendants are barred from asking for lenity outside of 
the law, surely prosecutors should be precluded from asking for 
vengeance (or even deterrence) outside of the law.80 It is possible, 
however, to interpret prosecutorial, conscience-of-the-community 
arguments in a way that does not attribute improper motives to 
every prosecutor who makes such arguments and that may help ex­
plain why so many courts have found such arguments acceptable. 
Prosecutors appear to have learned through experience that, in 
the eyes of at least some jurors, judgment is indeed a terrible thing. 
Those whose job it is to ask juries for convictions have learned that 
turning in a conviction can be a difficult thing to do, even for jurors 
convinced that a conviction is warranted and fully justified. It is for 
this reason that prosecutors often augment talk of conscience with 
that of courage. In a marijuana distribution case, for example, the 
prosecutor asked the jury in closing argument to "please have the 
courage to go out there and :find these Defendants guilty and come 
back and return guilty verdicts, because we need juries like your­
selves that have the courage to do that."81 It takes guts to look a 
man in the eye and convict, even if one is certain that a conviction is 
deserved. 
ety"); see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 540 N.E.2d 1316, 1321 {Mass. 1989) (stating that a 
verdict of guilt would end victims' nightmares); Commonwealth v. Ward, 550 N.E.2d 398, 406 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (criticizing prosecutor's rousing summons that "sounded a persistent 
theme that the jury had a duty to confront crime in the streets bravely and to avenge the 
wrong done the victim"). 
80. See, e.g., James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors 
When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 581-82 
(1995) (categorizing "conscience of the community" arguments with "send a message" argu· 
ments, and arguing that such arguments represent improper attempts to shift the jury's atten· 
tion away from guilt or innocence and toward community expectations or deterrence 
unrelated to the particular defendant's guilt or innocence). 
81. See United States v. Caballero, 712 F.2d 126, 131-32 {5th Cir. 1983) ("A fair reading 
of the closing argument confirms the accuracy of the district judge's ruling that the prosecu­
tor made a vigorous, but permissible, plea for law enforcement."). 
August 1999] Courage 2425 
In the recent Florida trial of an arms dealer, the prosecutor's 
closing arguments included the following: 
I leave you with one last thought to help you with th[e] difficulties [of 
deciding this case]. It's a quote John Kennedy gave just shortly 
before he was inaugurated president, quoting Luke 12:24. And he 
said: For those to whom much is given, much is required. And when 
at some future date the high court of history sits in judgment of each 
of us, determining whether in our brief span of service we have ful­
filled our obligations to the state, the answers to those questions will 
be determined by the responses to four questions: Are we truly men 
of dedication? Are we truly men of judgment? Are we truly men of 
integrity? And were we truly men of courage? Back in that jury 
room you have a difficult job to do. Walk back there and be men and 
women of dedication, judgment, integrity, and, most important, cour­
age. Do what you have to do and then get on with the business of 
living.82 
In a North Carolina murder case, for which the death penalty was 
not being sought, the prosecutor put it this way: 
Ladies, Gentlemen, when you hear of such acts, you say, gee, some­
body ought to do something about that. I want you to look around. 
You're that somebody that everybody else talks about . . . .  So, folks, 
you might as well look around. There is no mythical somebody hiding 
in this Courtroom. You are the somebody. You, the buck, as bad as 
you hate it, stops right here with you twelve people. 
Today you are the moral conscious [sic] of that community. It's up 
to you to see that justice is done. 83 
Though ungrammatical, "as bad as you hate it" seems apt. But why 
hate it? 
In some cases, judgment will be difficult - will weigh on the 
conscience - in the sense that it is hard to be certain whether one 
is doing the right thing. But anecdotal evidence suggests that at 
least some jurors find it difficult to convict even when they are per­
suaded a conviction is justified. Anyone who has spent time in a 
criminal courtroom will recall scenes of jurors in tears as they bring 
in a conviction. In addition, postverdict interviews tend to confirm 
that jurors struggle mightily with the burden of judgment.84 In what 
82. United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1401 (11th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) 
("These comments merely reiterated and exhorted to the jurors their duty to obey their oaths 
and to decide the case with dedication, judgment, integrity, and courage. The remarks by the 
prosecutor were as likely to lead to an acquittal as a conviction."). 
83. State v. Larrimore, 456 S.E.2d 789, 812 (N.C. 1995) (alteration in original). 
84. Nancy Marder has examined reports of postverdict interviewers with jurors and, 
under the heading "The Difficulty of Judging," reports the following: 
Occasionally jurors in post-verdict interviews comment on the difficulty inherent in the 
act of judging. Eight percent of the jurors' total comments included some reference to 
the process of decisionmaking as difficult, painful, or upsetting. Comments varied 
among jurors but the sentiment remained the same. For example, one juror in the 
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way is one's conscience implicated by turning in a fully justified 
conviction?. I suggest that jurors' consciences are implicated be­
cause they are being asked to play the role I have described. They 
are being asked to look at, and confront their agency in, the act of 
judgment. Not only does it implicate the conscience to make a 
tough decision - to figure out what one must do: it also may weigh 
upon the conscience - and thus require courage - to confront 
what one must do. 
The term "conscience" thus has both an outward or forward­
looking aspect and an inward or retrospective aspect. In the first 
sense, conscience is a guide to behavior. We hope that our con­
science will steer us toward right action. There is also, however, an 
inward or reflective sense of the term, as when a person is described 
as having a "clear conscience" or a "guilty conscience." That usage 
refers to conscience not as a guide to action but rather as a mental 
state - a state of awareness of responsibility for actions taken. 
Shakespeare's Hamlet illustrates both senses of the word "con­
science." When Hamlet says that "conscience does make cowards 
of us all," he is talking about the difficulty inherent in figuring out 
what to do. When he schemes that "[t]he play's the thing/ Wherein 
I'll catch the conscience of the King," he is, however, talking about 
something else entirely. He is talking about bringing the King face 
to face with what he has done.ss 
I suggest that the jury may serve as the conscience of the com­
munity in both senses. Not only might we hope that a community­
based sense of right and wrong will guide juror decisionmaking in 
appropriate cases, we might recognize as well, and thereby better 
comprehend the various uses of the term "conscience," that the jury 
Oliver North trial described the process as "the most difficult decision of [her] life," 
while another in that case described herself as "mentally and physically exhausted." A 
juror in the 'fyson trial described decisionmaking as "a difficult thing to do." In the 
Rodney King civil suit, one juror recounted "br[eaking] down in tears on several occa­
sions," "be[coming] sick to her stomach from watching the taped beating," and being 
"haunted" by King's screams, while another described how "some nights he tossed and 
turned in a fitful slumber with the day's debate playing over and over in his head." A 
juror in the Gotti trial described decisionmaking as "tough," whereas a juror in the trial 
of Colin Ferguson, who was convicted of several counts of murder and attempted mur­
der in the shooting of several passengers on the Long Island Railroad, described the 
process as "a once in a lifetime experience that was very, very draining." The foreman in 
the Crown Heights trial, speaking for the entire jury, described the jury's task as "not 
easy" and "very nerve-racking," and the mother of a young juror in the Reginald Denny 
beating explained that her daughter "had never before been forced to make difficult 
decisions like this." 
Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures, A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews of Jurors, 
82 lowA L. REv. 465, 484-85 (1997) (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original). 
85. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1, I. 82, act 2, 
sc. 2, 11. 604-05 (G. Blakemore Evans ed., 2 Riverside Shakespeare 1974). 
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is the institution through which some of us are forced to an aware­
ness of our responsibility for what we do. 
B. The Caldwell Doctrine 
George Priest has described the jury as "aresponsible," in light 
of the fact that jury verdicts are largely immune to review.86 In a 
sense, however, this characterization gets it exactly wrong. If, as I 
have suggested, being "responsible" is understood to mean, at least 
in part, "taking responsibility" - acknowledging agency - then 
perhaps only the unreviewable are capable of performing the role. 
Perhaps only those who know they have the last word will feel truly 
responsible for their actions. To be specific, if jurors are to act as 
the conscience of the ·community in the way I have described, they 
need to understand two things. First they should know that they do 
in fact have the last word - that no one will go behind them and fix 
what they have done. Second, they should understand that the last 
word is in fact theirs - that no one can or will tell them what to do. 
If jurors' consciences are to be fully implicated, they must un­
derstand themselves to be acting, rather than merely deciding. For 
this to be the case, they must understand that no one - no higher 
authority - stands between them and the fate of the defendant. 
This concern may be best illustrated by Caldwell v. Mississippi. 87 
There, the United States Supreme Court reversed a death sentence 
imposed after the prosecutor had emphasized to the jury that any 
decision they reached would be subject to appeal. 
· 
In closing argument, defense counsel asked the jury to "confront 
both the gravity and the responsibility of calling for another's 
death."88 In response, "the prosecutor forcefully argued that the 
defense had done something wholly illegitimate in trying to force 
the jury to feel a sense of responsibility for its decision."89 The 
prosecutor argued: 
Now, they would have you believe that you're going to kill this man 
and they know - they know that your decision is not the final deci­
sion. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable. They 
know it. Yet they . . .  [are] insinuating that your decision is the final 
86. See Priest, supra note 44, at 168. 
87. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
88. Caldwel� 472 U.S. at 324 (quoting the defense counsel's argument to the jury as: "I 
implore you to think deeply about this matter. It is his life or death - the decision you're 
going to have to make . . . .  You can give him life or you can give him death. It's going to be 
your decision . . . .  You are the judges and you will have to decide his fate. It is an awesome 
responsibility, I know - an awesome responsibility."). 
89. 472 U.S. at 324. 
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decision and that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in front of 
this Courthouse in moments and string him up and that is terribly, 
terribly unfair. For they know, as I know, and as Judge Baker has told 
you, that the decision you render is automatically reviewable by the 
Supreme Court.90 
In vacating the sentence, the Court concluded that "it is consti­
tutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determina­
tion made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the 
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defend­
ant's death rests elsewhere."91 The Court further observed that 
"the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate 
determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable 
danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance 
of its role."92 
Similar concerns were expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in re­
viewing a capital sentence imposed in Florida.93 Under Florida's 
capital-sentencing scheme, the jury's recommendation was merely 
advisory. Nonetheless, it violated the Eighth Amendment to allow 
the prosecutor to minimize the jury's responsibility by repeatedly 
emphasizing that: "You understand you do not impose the death 
penalty; that is not on your shoulders . . . .  You will have the oppor­
tunity after you have heard everything there is to hear to make a 
recommendation . . . . But it is not legally on your shoulders, 
though. It is not your ultimate decision."94 The court held that 
"[u]nder such circumstances, a real danger exists that a resulting 
death sentence will be based at least in part on the determination of 
a decisionmaker that has been misled as to the nature of its 
responsibility. "95 
The Caldwell doctrine offers an example of a situation in which 
the jury's awareness of its responsibility has been considered cen­
tral. In this light, it seems plausible to look for other circumstances 
90. 472 U.S. at 325-26. 
91. 472 U.S. at 328-29. 
92. 472 U.S. at 333; see also Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986) (vacating 
death sentence). In Wheat, the prosecutor first described the appellate procedure in detail 
and then argued as follows: 
Again, I say to you, and then I'll leave it to you, just remember this, if your verdict is that 
of the death penalty, that's not final. There's so many more people who will look at this 
case after you have made your decision in this case. Others will look at it, and look at 
your work, and see if you've made the right decision. And I can assure you, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, that if one finds that you have not, that they will send him back, and tell us 
to try it over, because someone made a mistake. 
793 F.2d at 527-28 n.7. 
93. See Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
94. 844 F.2d at 1455. 
95. 844 F.2d at 1455. 
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under which the failure on the part of the jury to acknowledge re­
sponsibility for a verdict may be, if not unconstitutional, at least 
troubling. It would be a mistake, however, to make too much of 
Caldwell and its progeny. First of all, the doctrine applies only to 
capital cases.96 Second, Caldwell has been interpreted narrowly to 
apply not to all statements that might diminish the jury's sense of 
responsibility, but only to false and misleading statements likely to 
have that effect.97 Finally, Caldwell was about fairness rather than 
courage. The improper attempt to diminish the jury's sense of re­
sponsibility violated the ·Eighth Amendment because of the pos­
sibility that the jury might not otherwise have imposed the death 
penalty. 
Accordingly, Caldwell offers only indirect support for my claim 
that the responsibility-taking role of the jury should be valued in its 
own right. I argue, however, that Caldwell-like concerns transcend 
the narrow boundaries of the doctrine itself. As the Court in 
Caldwell observed, death penalty jurisprudence is informed by the 
assumption that "jurors confronted with the truly awesome respon­
sibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due re­
gard for the consequences of their decision."98 Capital sentencing 
need not be understood as unique in this regard. Sentencing a per­
son to prison may lack the finality of death, but that hardly makes it 
a less than "awesome responsibility"; and one might hope that 
criminal juries would in general have "due regard for the conse­
quences of their decision[s]." 
96. The court's decision was grounded in a belief that "the qualitative difference of death 
from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capi­
tal sentencing determination." See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329 (quoting California v. Ramos, 
463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)). 
97. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) ("As Justice O'Connor supplied the fifth 
vote in Caldwell and concurred on grounds narrower than those put forth by the plurality, 
her position is controlling. Accordingly, we have since read Caldwell as 'relevant only to 
certain types of comment - those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing pro­
cess in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing 
decision.' Thus, '[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that 
the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law."' 
(citations omitted)). In addition, the doctrine has not been applied retroactively. See Sawyer 
v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (stating that the Caldwell rule is not a watershed rule of crimi­
nal procedure fundamental to integrity of criminal proceeding and, thus, a prisoner whose 
murder conviction became final before rule was announced could not use rule to challenge 
his capital sentence in federal habeas corpus action). 
98. Caldwel� 472 U.S. at 329-30 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 
(1971)). 
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C. Usurpation and Abdication 
In addition to understanding that they have the last word, juries 
should understand as well that there is no one to whom they can or 
should defer in determining what that last word should be. Recog­
nizing the responsibility-taking role of the jury may thus help ex­
plain judicial resistance to certain forms of expert testimony and 
scientific evidence. If expert testimony or scientific evidence ap­
pears sufficiently authoritative, jurors may be tempted to ease their 
sense of responsibility for a verdict. I do not mean that jurors will 
abdicate their decisionmaking function; they still have to decide 
whose experts to believe. Rather, jurors may evade their 
responsibility-taking role; they may understand themselves as 
merely deciding whose experts to believe. 
Courts have repeatedly greeted new forms of evidence with con­
cerns that such evidence will usurp the role of the jury. Tradition­
ally, this concern manifested itself in the form of testimonial 
limitations. Lay witnesses were precluded from offering opinions;99 
and expert \vitnesses were precluded from testifying to "ultimate 
issues."100 While the opinion rule and the ultimate issue rule have 
been largely abandoned, 101 judicial uneasiness over certain forms of 
expert testimony persists. For example, courts continue to resist ex­
pert testimony on witness credibility, including testimony regarding 
polygraph results. Contrary to one commentator's assertion that 
"[t]he objection that an eyewitness expert usurps the jury's role by 
giving an expert opinion of witness credibility has largely been 
99. The opinion rule was a nineteenth-century co=on law offshoot of the rule requiring 
witnesses to have personal knowledge. The personal knowledge rule, in tum, traces its his­
tory to at least the fifteenth century, with Coke's assertion that it "is not satisfactory for the 
witness to say that he thinks or persuadeth himself." Rolfe v. Hampden, 73 Eng. Rep. 117, 
118 n.15 (K.B. 1622); see also Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 415 
(1952); Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: Time to Take the 
Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 835 (1988). For a discussion of the opinion rule, see 
CHAfu.Es ALAN WRIGHJ' & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 6252 (1997). 
100. The leading case stating the ultimate issue rule was United States v. Spaulding, 239 
U.S. 498, 506 (1935) (ruling that medical expert testimony that plaintiff was "totally and 
permanently disabled" was inadmissible because "[t]he experts ought not to have been asked 
or allowed to state their conclusions on the whole case"). 
101. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay witnesses to offer opinions 
that are "rationally based on the perception of the witness and . . .  helpful to a clear under­
standing of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." See FED. R. Evm. 
701. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides that expert testimony "is not objectionable be­
cause it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." See FED. R. Evm. 
704(a). An exception to Rule 704 retains the ultimate issue bar as to expert testimony on 
"whether the defendant [in a criminal case] did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto." See FED. R. Evm. 
704(b). 
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abandoned, "102 many courts continue to exclude expert testimony 
about credibility, and on just that basis.103 Similar concerns have 
been expressed in the debate over polygraph evidence.104 
So long as one understands the function of the jury as being 
solely that of factfinder, however, this concern appears to reduce to 
nothing more than a mistrust of the jury's ability to evaluate evi-
102. Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 
PsYcHOL. Ptm. PoLY. & L. 909, 922 {1995). 
103. See, e.g., United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1439 {4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("[A]n 
opinion on the credibility of a witness by a psychiatrist is not allowable."); United States v. 
Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 {2d Cir. 1988) ("[W]itnesses may not opine as to the credibility of the 
testimony of other witnesses at the trial."); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (stating that expert scientific evidence "may in some circumstances assume a pos­
ture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen"); United States v. Wertis, 505 F.2d 
683, 685 {5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) {finding opinion of psychiatrist as to whether a witness 
could distinguish truth from nontruth was "beyond the competence of any witness"); United 
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 {9th Cir. 1973) {finding that expert testimony on credibil­
ity "may cause juries to surrender their own co=on sense in weighting testimony"); 
Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 451 {D.C. Cir. 1967) {"It has often been argued 
that in the guise of an expert, the psychiatrist became the thirteenth juror, and unfortunately 
the most important one."); Co=onwealth v. O'Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 32 {Pa. 1976) ("To per­
mit psychological testimony . . .  would be an invitation for the trier of fact to abdicate its 
responsibility to ascertain the facts relying upon the questionable premise that the expert is 
in a better position to make such a judgment"); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and 
The Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 165, 195 & n.165 (1990) 
{"Courts have also excluded expert testimony about credibility as unfairly prejudicial on the 
ground that the jury will accord it exaggerated importance. The expert would usurp the role 
of the jury by substituting the conclusions of the expert for the independent conclusions 
drawn by the lay jurors." (citing United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 {8th Cir. 1986), 
where the court stated that "putting an impressively qualified expert's stamp of truthfulness 
on a witness's story goes too far")). Some courts have been more lenient and have held that 
the admission of such testimony is within the discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., Bastow v. 
General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 506, 510-11 {8th Cir. 1988); Azure, 801 F.2d at 339-40; State 
v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1339 n.14 (Haw. 1982) ("Essentially, the difference between an opin­
ion as to character for truthfulness and an opinion as to the believability of a witness' [sic] 
statements is the difference between 'I think X is believable' and 'X's statement is believa­
ble.' We feel the admissibility of either statement should not turn on niceties of phraseology 
but on the probative value of the testimony."); United States v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135, 140 {2d 
Cir. 1975) ("[W]hether or not psychiatric testimony is admissible to impeach the credibility of 
a witness is within the discretion of the trial judge.''). See generally 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, 
FEDERAL PRACI1CE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE supra note 99, § 6114 {1993). 
104. See, e.g., Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396-97 {9th Cir. 1984) (arguing that poly­
graph evidence "interferes with . . .  the deliberative process"); United States v. Alexander, 
526 F.2d 161, 168 {8th Cir. 1975) (arguing that polygraph evidence is "likely to be shrouded 
with an aura of near infallibility"); Alexander, 526 F.2d at 168-69, quoted in U.S. DEPT. OF 
DEFENSE, MANuAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 48 {1995) ("To the extent that the polygraph re­
sults are accepted as unimpeachable or conclusive by jurors, despite cautionary instructions 
by the trial judge, the jurors' traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the facts and 
adjudge guilt or innocence is preempted.''); Dowd v. Calabrese, 585 F. Supp. 430, 434-35 
(D.D.C. 1984) (arguing that juries would likely give undue deference to polygraph evidence); 
State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 651-53 {WIS. 1981); Kenneth A. Wittenberg & Kenneth L. 
Si=ons, Troth or Consequences: The Changing Dynamics of Polygraph Tests, 58 OR. ST. B. 
BULL. 23, 24 {1997) {"Those that oppose the use of polygraph exams . . .  believe that science 
usurps the jury's role when it purports to claim which witness is telling the truth."); see also 
David Gallai, Polygraph Evidence in Federal Courts: Should It Be Admissible?, 36 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 87, 103 (1999). 
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dence.105 Seen in this light, the language of usurpation seems mis­
placed. Wigmore, for example, maintained that such talk was "a 
mere bit of empty rhetoric."106 He argued that no witness can 
usurp the jury's role because "the jury may still reject his opinion 
and accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the 
judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness's opinion 
against their own."107 Perhaps the real concern is that juries will be 
bamboozled - will be overawed by scientific-sounding expert testi­
mony. This fear, however, appears largely unwarranted. For exam­
ple, research does not support the claim that juries give inordinate 
weight to expert testimony on credibility.ios Similarly, evidence 
suggests that juries would not in fact overestimate the reliability of 
polygraph evidence.109 
105. See Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: 1ime to Take 
the Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 849 (1988) ("[A]t the heart of the matter, underly­
ing the ultimate issue rule was an assumption that jurors would abdicate their factfinding role 
to the witness. Judges apparently felt that . . .  jurors could easily be led to whatever ultimate 
conclusion was desired by the proponent of the expert testimony."); Teri Breuer, Note, The 
End of Frye is the Beginning of Successful Sexual Assault Prosecution, 2 S. CAL. RBv. L. & 
WoMEN's STUD. 333, 338 (1992) ("The courts are also concerned with the possibility that the 
expert would usurp the role of the jury. Courts fear that the jury would substitute the conclu­
sions of the expert for its own independent conclusions, especially as the expert's testimony 
approached ultimate issues."). 
106. 7 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920, at 18 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 
ed. 1978). 
107. Id. § 1920, at 19. 
108. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach 
to an Expert's Opinion About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 
559, 604-16 (1989); Charles Robert Honts, Assessing Children's Credibility: Scientific and 
Legal Issues in 1994, 70 N.D. L. REv. 879, 896 {1994) ("There does not seem to be any reason 
to suspect that direct expert testimony on child witness credibility will have the magical pow­
ers to overwhelm juries that other scientific evidence lacks."). See generally Michael W. 
Mullane, The Truthsayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43 ME. L. RBv. 53 
(1991). 
109. See, e.g., Ann Cavoukian & Ronald J. Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph 
Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117 (1980); Charles R. 
Honts & Mary V. Perry, Polygraph Admissibility: Changes and Challenges, 16 LAW & HuM. 
BEHAV. 357, 366 (1992) ("Studies tend to show that juries are more inclined not to give 
extraordinary weight to polygraph evidence."); James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reeval­
uation - Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 375-77 
(1996) ("[R]ecent studies suggest that jurors do not give polygraph results disproportionate 
weight."); see also United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1533 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(en bane) (citing Stephen C. Carlson et al., The Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on Jury 
Deliberations: An Empirical Study, 5 J. PoLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 148 (1977) for the proposition 
that many studies refute contention that jurors give disproportionate weight to polygraph 
evidence); Alan Markwart & Brian E. Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock 
Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. POLICE Sex. & ADMIN. 324 (1979); Robert A. Peters, A Survey of 
Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 AB.A. J. 162 (1982)). See generally 1 PAUL C. 
GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMwINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 520 (2d ed. 1993) (arguing 
that "the clear weight of the available hard data calls into question the assumption . . .  that 
scientific evidence overwhelms the typical lay juror"). 
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Yet one need not dismiss concerns about expert testimony as 
mere judicial mistrust of the jury. Assume that jurors are in no way 
overwhelmed or bamboozled by expert testimony - that they still 
decide the case themselves. The jurors then may come to under­
stand themselves as doing that and no more. If jurors understand 
the question before them to be merely "whose experts do you be­
lieve," they may be less likely to confront - to feel truly responsi­
ble for - the act of judgment that follows from choosing to believe 
the State's witnesses.110 If juries are to feel responsible for verdicts, 
they must see themselves as participants rather than commentators. 
Doing, not deciding, implicates the conscience. Even if expert testi­
mony cannot usurp the jury's decisionmaking role, it may put at risk 
the jury's responsibility-taking function by allowing jurors to under­
stand themselves as merely deferring to authority. "Abdication" 
might be a more accurate term than "usurpation," for the risk is not 
in what the experts will take, but in what the jurors might too wil­
lingly let go - the sense of personal responsibility for judgments. 
I am not prepared to argue that expert testimony should be ex­
cluded in order to make sure juries feel responsible for verdicts. 
My particular claim regarding expert testimony is more modest, and 
is explanatory rather than prescriptive. I merely suggest that recog­
nizing the jury's responsibility-taking role may shed light on judicial 
discomfort with the ever-increasing role of expert witnesses in the 
courtroom. 
D. The Uncertain Status of Jury Nullification 
Few matters related to the criminal trial jury have received as 
much attention lately as the question of jury nullification.111 When, 
110. Charles Nesson offers a related explanation for judicial resistance to statistical evi­
dence. Nesson argues that effective deterrence depends upon verdicts that the public will 
view "as statements about what [actually] happened," rather than as statements about the 
evidence presented at trial. See Nesson, supra note 4, at 1367. Similarly, the jury's 
responsibility-taking function demands that they not understand themselves as merely decid­
ing which expert to believe. 
111. A sample of recent law review literature focusing entirely or in part on nullification 
would include: Darryl K. Brown, Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 
1149 {1997) (arguing that "in contrast with prevailing assumptions about nullification by both 
its supporters and detractors, . . .  nullification can, and in many contexts does, occur within 
the rule of law rather than subvert it"); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black 
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 {1995); David N. Dorfman & Chris 
K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 861 {1995); James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret Constitutional 
Right, LITIGATION, Summer 1996, at 6; David Farnham, Jury Nullification: History Proves It's 
Not a New Idea, CRIM. Jusr., Wmter 1997, at 4; Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, 
Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 Mn.. L. REv. 133 n.16 
(1993); Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to 
Professor Butler, 44 U.C. Los ANGELES L. REv. 109 {1996) {arguing, among other things, 
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if ever, can or should juries refuse to convict despite the fact that 
the law appears to warrant a conviction? The arguments on this 
issue are contentious and energetic, and often conflate issues which 
might helpfully be distinguished. As noted above, there is substan­
tial uncertainty regarding the empirical question of how rare or fre­
quent nullification actually is.112 Beyond that, there are debates 
regarding the legal status of nullification. Is it a right?113 An extra­
legal power?H4 An unlawful practice?115 These arguments are 
often tied to underlying disputes over the desirability or normative 
status of nullification. Do we call to mind the brave Massachusetts 
jurors of a century and a half ago who refused to convict under the 
fugitive slave laws? Or do we envision white Southern juries refus­
ing to convict those guilty of lynching blacks? 
Without intending to slight the complexity of these debates, my 
aim here is neither to catalogue nor to adjudicate between them. 
Instead, I focus on a particular puzzle which appears to underlie 
arguments about the legal and normative status of nullification. 
The puzzle is this. On one hand, courts work very hard to prevent 
jurors from nullifying. At the same time, however, courts are 
equally energetic in preserving an array of procedural rules and 
practices which seem calculated to preserve the jury's power to nul­
lify. Recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking role helps recon­
cile the apparent contradiction. 
The key is that responsibility depends upon an awareness of 
choice. If jurors did not have the power to acquit, they could not 
and would feel a sense of responsibility for or agency in convictions. 
The power to nullify thus plays a role which does not depend on an 
argument that that power should ever be utilized. We hope that 
juries will convict when convictions are warranted. The criminal 
justice system depends upon their doing so. We hope that juries 
will follow instructions, but we do not want for them to understand 
themselves as "just following orders." If the jury is to perform the 
that race-based jury nullification subverts the rule of law and will ultimately rebound to the 
detriment of the very minority groups which appear to be short term beneficiaries); Andrew 
D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253 (1996); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon 
M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
165, 175 (1991) (describing grass roots support for nullification and claiming that "[t]he jury 
nullification movement is more active now than at any previous period"); Weinstein, supra 
note 61, at 240 ("When juries refuse to convict on the basis of what they think are unjust 
laws, they are performing their duty as jurors."). 
112. See supra notes 59-61, and accompanying text. 
113. See Duane, supra note 111, at 6. 
114. See Butler, supra note 111; Dorfman & Iijima, supra note 111. 
115. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 111, at 133 n.16; Leipold, supra note 111. 
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responsibility-taking role described above, jurors need to know that 
they are being asked, rather than forced, to convict when the law so 
warrants. 
In order to highlight the potential incongruity, I again make the 
simplifying assumption that nullification is generally undesirable. I 
do not suggest that the issue is simply a binary question of "desira­
ble" v. "undesirable." Much less do I intend to dismiss arguments 
in favor of nullification.116 Rather, the assumption is warranted as 
a matter of argument simply because courts continue to behave as if 
nullification were a thing to be avoided. The courts have come 
down firmly against efforts to describe nullification as a right rather 
than a power.117 Similarly, courts have rejected efforts by defend­
ants to have juries instructed as to their nullification power.118 The 
116. In particular, I readily recognize that nullification is not without its supporters. On 
the popular front, an energetic group based in rural Montana (but operating nationwide), 
known as the Fully Informed Jury Association, goes so far as to hand out pamphlets to poten­
tial jurors outside of courtrooms. The pamphlets advocate nullification and "inform" jurors 
they "cannot be forced to obey a 'jurors oath.' " See Frederic B. Rogers, The Jury in Revolt? 
A "Heads Up" on the Fully Informed Jury Association Coming Soon to a Courthouse in Your 
Area, JUDGES J., Summer 1996, at 10, 11. Although the Fully Informed Jury Association 
appears to be a fringe group, nullification has found support within the mainstream. See 
Rogers, supra, at 10 ("[T]he Fully Informed Jury Association is led by its national coordina­
tor, Don Doig, of Helmville [Montana], population 26. Its antecedents are in the radical anti­
Semitic right and the writings of militia activist MJ. "Red" Beckman."); see also Erick J. 
Haynie, Comment, Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law: The "Fully Informed" Jury 
Movement and Its Implications, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CruM!NoLOGY 343 (1997). For example, 
former federal prosecutor and current law professor Paul Butler has argued that, in light of 
the discriminatory and utterly ineffective manner in which drug laws are drafted and en­
forced, black jurors would be justified in refusing to convict blacks accused of nonviolent 
drug crimes. See Butler, supra note 111. 
Less notorious, but no less thought provoking, are the arguments mounted by James 
Duane. See Duane, supra note 111, at 6. Duane has argued that the Sixth Amendment, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, and a history of judicial deference to jury verdicts all suggest that 
juries should be informed not only of their power to nullify, but also of their right to do so. 
Duane is careful to disavow the straw man claim that juries should be encouraged to disre­
gard the courts' instruction for whatever reason they choose. Instead, his claim is that juries 
have a well-established and long-recognized right to acquit for the specific purpose of lenity 
- to inject "a slack into the enforcement of the law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying 
influence of current ethical conventions." Id. at 9 (quoting United States ex reL Mccann v. 
Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942)); see also Brown, supra note 111; Farnham, supra 
note 111. 
117. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, (1984) (describing nullification 
as a "lawless decision"); United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing 
jury nullification as "lawless"); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(describing nullification as moments when juries "choose to .flex their muscles, ignoring both 
law and evidence"); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Sparf 
v. U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895), which held that "[t]he principle . . .  that it is the duty of the 
jury to apply the law as declared by the court (notwithstanding the finality of an acquittal 
inconsistent with the law, and the resulting 'pardoning power' of the jury) was firmly estab­
lished by the Supreme Court"). 
118. See, e.g., Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1190 (holding that courts are to "instruct the jury on 
the dimensions of their duty to the exclusion of jury nullification"); United States v. Krzyske, 
836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988) (approving trial court's refusal to give nullification in-
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courts may be wrong, but for the time being they refuse to en­
courage or applaud jury nullification. 
This seems all well and good until one reflects upon the wide 
array of ways in which the courts have made sure juries retain this 
power (which they have no right to use and which they should not 
be told about). For example, directed verdicts are prohibited in 
criminal cases, regardless of the weight of the evidence.119 As a 
consequence, appellate courts are not permitted to take judicial no­
tice of facts, however undisputed, that are necessary to a convic­
tion.120 Special verdicts as well are disfavored in criminal cases, out 
of a concern that requiring juries to explain their verdicts will limit 
their ability simply to acquit.121 
struction and statement to jury that "valid jury nullification" does not exist); United States v. 
Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that jury instructions on nullification 
would invite juries to disregard the law). 
119. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516 n.5 (1979) (holding that the 
Constitution bars directed verdicts against defendants in criminal cases regardless of strength 
of State's evidence); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.5 (1976) (finding directed 
verdict to be "totally alien to our notions of criminal justice [because] the discretionary act of 
jury nullification would not be permitted"). 
120. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 20l(g); United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(holding appellate court was not permitted to take judicial notice of undisputed fact that 
South Central Bell Telephone Company was "a co=on carrier . . .  providing or operating 
. . .  facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign co=unications" (citations omit­
ted)). This rule has been roundly and justifiably criticized on the grounds that it amounts to 
the following claim: appellate courts should not take notice of any fact necessary to a convic­
tion, however undisputed, because of the possibility that the jury, which decided not to ac­
quit, might have acquitted if presented with the possibility of using a patently false finding -
e.g., that the telephone company is not a co=on carrier - as a hook for that acquittal, 
despite the fact that, if the jury had decided to acquit, no explanation for nullification could 
or would have been required. See 10 JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC­
TICE § 201.70 (2d ed. 1996). 
121. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 168 F.3d 558, 562 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); see also 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7a, at 1050 (2d ed. 
1992) (noting that special verdicts in criminal cases are "not favored"); 3 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGIIT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE­
DURE § 512 n.5 (2d ed. 1982) ("The rule against special verdicts in criminal cases is nothing 
more nor less than a recognition of the principle that 'the jury, as conscience of the co=u­
nity, must be permitted to look at more than logic."' (citing United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 
165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969))); Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law 
of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARv. L. REv. 771, 835 (1998) ("Courts have resisted special 
verdicts in criminal cases precisely because such verdicts would endanger the jury's capacity 
to be merciful." (citing United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 927 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). For cases dealing with concerns regarding 
special verdicts, see United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416-18 (3d Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 1980); and Spock, 416 F.2d at 182. There are, 
however, cases in which special verdicts in criminal cases are considered appropriate. See 
United States v. Melvin, 27 F.3d 710, 716 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that trial court may use a 
special verdict in certain entrapment cases). There are even cases in which such verdicts are 
required. See FED. R. CRIM. PRoc. 31(e) for an example of requiring special verdicts in 
certain criminal forfeiture cases. 
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Why work so hard to protect a power if we do not want it to be 
used? If jurors are obligated and expected to follow instructions, 
why is their power to do otherwise considered so important? One 
answer may lie in jury's responsibility-taking role. Without the pos­
sibility of nullification, juror agency would be vitiated. Unless they 
could refuse to convict, jurors will not feel responsible for convic­
tions. On this reading, it is the possibility, rather than the event, of 
nullification that matters. Nullification is a risk we must bear if we 
want jurors to feel agency. When, therefore, courts protect the 
jury's nullification power while at the same time refusing to endorse 
nullification, it is not necessary to accuse them of hypocrisy or con­
fusion. Nor is it necessary to accuse (or credit) the courts with en­
couraging nullification. Recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking 
function offers an explanation for why we might well desire to pro­
tect a power even if we hope it is never used. 
V. ENGENDERING JURY REsPONSIBILITY 
What follows? If courage of the sort I have described is worth 
having, and the jury is in fact one institution through which this 
form of courage might be displayed, what concrete aspects of jury 
decisionmaking can contribute to the jury's ability to perform this 
role? In this Part, I make four recommendations. Two will be rela­
tively uncontroversial: first, juries ought to be as representative as 
possible; second, criminal juries ought to be required to turn in 
unanimous verdicts. My third recommendation will be less readily 
embraced: juries ought to know what punishment will follow a con­
viction. My final recommendation is more tentative and might be 
difficult to apply without unduly risking the jury's decisionmaking 
function: juries ought to be instructed in such a way as to impress 
upon them their agency in bringing about the consequences of a 
conviction. 
A. Jury Representativeness 
The most straightforward implication of my claim is that juries 
ought to be drawn from a true cross-section of the community. 
Granted, one need not reimagine the jury in order to generate argu­
ments on behalf of representativeness. For example, it has been 
argued that making juries more representative will reduce bias, fa­
cilitate deliberation, enhance the public acceptability of verdicts, 
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and inject differing viewpoints into the criminal justice system.122 
The United States Supreme Court has systematically invalidated 
practices of exclusionary jury selection.123 In general, the history of 
the criminal jury in America reveals an inexorable, if yet unfinM 
ished, march towards inclusiveness.124 Recognizing the jury's 
responsibility-taking function, however, does put an interesting 
twist on the matter. While many arguments for jury representativeM 
ness hinge on a desire to ensure that those at the margins of society 
are not excluded, my concern here is that those in the mainstream 
not be permitted to exclude themselves. 
Throughout this article I refer to juries and jurors in the third 
person, as I argue that "they" ought to feel responsibility for and 
acknowledge agency in judgments made on behalf of the com­
munity. I should emphasize, however, that they are us. I am not 
advocating that jurors as some separate and identifiable subset of 
the population are the appropriate people to take responsibility for 
troubling judgments. Rather, my claim is that ideally all of us 
would acknowledge that agency. This being impractical, we should 
take turns. The jury is the institution through which we, as jurors, 
acknowledge responsibility for what we, as members of the com­
munity, find it necessary or appropriate to do. Accordingly, my 
claim both depends upon and provides an argument for jury 
representativeness. 
If the jury is to function as an institution through which we take 
turns acknowledging agency, rather than as a method of asking 
some subset of the population to do so on our behalf, all those who 
would seek to influence the content of the law ought to be willing as 
well to accept responsibility for the consequences of the law. For 
this reason, it seems appropriate that all registered voters should be 
required to serve on criminal juries from time to time. I do not 
122. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That ls Both 
Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 703 (1998); Andrew G. Deiss, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist 
America, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 323 (1996); Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race­
Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Em­
pirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CruM. L. REv. 1177 (1994); Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1996); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's 
Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1377 (1994). 
123. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (invalidating preemp­
tory challenges based on gender); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (holding exclusion­
ary practices in grand jury selection not remedied by subsequent fair trial untainted by racial 
discrimination); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (invalidating racially discriminatory 
jury selection practices); see also James H. Coleman, The Evolution of Race in the Jury Selec­
tion Process, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1105 (1996). 
124. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 15. 
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mean that jury service should be limited to registered voters. On 
the contrary, all should serve. My claim is that those who would 
fancy themselves lawmakers ought as well to take a tum as respon­
sibility takers. 
It will perhaps be objected that laws are most often made not by 
the people directly, but by legislatures. As a result, one might ar­
gue that those laws may or may not reflect the actual desires of the 
people themselves. Perhaps it is unfair to ask us to take responsi­
bility for what they have decided. Perhaps the people should be 
asked to take direct responsibility for only those laws which they 
have directly endorsed through referenda or initiatives. 
To this I have two responses. First of all, it may be unwarranted 
to claim that legislative decisions are less representative of popular 
will than are direct democratic outcomes. As I have argued else­
where, neither direct democracy nor representation is capable of 
producing results unambiguously describable as the will of the peo­
ple.125 More to the point, it should not matter what processes we as 
a people have decided to employ in the construction of our criminal 
law. It remains our law. The democratic project depends upon the 
premise that rules generated through certain agreed-upon processes 
are fairly attributable to the whole. We have agreed to call our own 
those laws made by processes into which we are each given fair and 
equal input. Each of us is required to follow laws we did not vote 
for. Beyond that, each of us as jurors is asked to enforce laws we 
did not vote for. It seems equally fair, and equally a consequence 
of democratic politics, that we each be asked to accept responsibil­
ity for those laws. 
I embrace, however, the connection between democratic politics 
and the jury's responsibility-taking role. On one view of the jury, 
the institution is understood as protecting against the illegitimate 
exercise of state force. Juries, on this reading, must serve as the 
conscience of the community in order to protect defendants against 
arbitrary and unwarranted prosecution. On my terms, however, the 
jury's role as the passive, responsibility-taking conscience of the 
community is equally important, and perhaps more fairly imposed 
upon jurors, to the extent that the power being exercised is legiti­
mate. The clearer it is that a law has the support of the people, the 
fairer it is to ask the people to take responsibility for that law's 
consequences. 
125. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HAR.v. L. REv. 
434 (1998). 
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This does not mean that the jury's responsibility-taking function 
should be modulated according to the perceived legitimacy of each 
law. As I have argued, it is our law, like it or not. Rather, the 
connection between legitimacy and responsibility suggests that each 
should be maximized independently. Both our lawmaking and our 
responsibility-taking institutions should be as broadly representa­
tive as possible. 
B. The Unanimity Requirement 
A juror is unlikely to feel truly responsible for a conviction un­
less he or she understands that the verdict depends upon his or her 
agreement. Put more strongly, no juror will feel truly responsible 
for a criminal conviction if that juror feels that the defendant would 
have been convicted with or without his or her concurrence. For 
this reason, the jury's responsibility-taking function is best facili­
tated by requiring that criminal trial juries return unanimous 
verdicts. 
American courts for the most part require unanimous verdicts 
for criminal convictions. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court 
held that unanimous verdicts are not constitutionally required and 
that 10-2 or 9-3 verdicts would suffice to perform the essential func­
tion of the criminal jury; but unanimity remains the overwhelming 
norm.126 The unanimity requirement has been explained or de­
fended on several grounds. Traditionally, it has been argued that 
only by requiring unanimous verdicts can criminal trials adequately 
protect defendants from the power of the state.127 Recently, theo­
rists have emphasized the deliberative and representative functions 
of the jury and argued that the requirement of unanimity forces 
jurors to talk to one another and to take into consideration the 
opinions and perspectives of the other jurors.12s 
Justice Kennedy, concurring in McKoy v. North Carolina, ex­
pressed a combination of these concerns and connected them to the 
idea of community conscience, when he noted that the unanimity 
requirement "is an accepted, vital mechanism to ensure that real 
126. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 {1972). To date, only Louisiana and Oregon 
permit criminal convictions by less than unanimous verdicts. 
127. See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 353 {1898) {"The wise men who framed 
the Constitution of the United States were of [the] opinion that life and liberty, when in­
volved in criminal prosecutions, would not be adequately secured except through the unani­
mous verdict of twelve jurors."), quoted in JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE TIIE JURY 179 {1994). 
128. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 127, at 191-96; REm HAsTIE ET AL., INsIDE TiiE 
JURY 173-74 {1983). 
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and full deliberation occurs in the jury room, and that the jury's 
ultimate decision will reflect the conscience of the community."129 
The McKay case involved the requirement of unanimity on the 
part of juries making capital sentencing recommendations. In the 
same context, the North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized 
the role played by the unanimity requirement in preventing jurors 
from avoiding their responsibility to make difficult decisions: 
"[T]he jury unanimity requirement prevents the jury from evading 
its duty to make a sentence recommendation. If jury unanimity is 
not required, then a jury that was uncomfortable in deciding life 
and death issues simply could 'agree to disagree' and escape its duty 
to render a decision."13o In addition to forcing juries to make dif­
ficult decisions in the context of sentencing recommendations, 
where avoiding the decision entirely might seem possible, I suggest 
that unanimity also plays a role in ensuring that each juror con­
fronts his or her own "but-for" agency ·in that decision. 
Take the easy case first. Imagine a scenario in which 10-2 would 
suffice for a conviction, but the verdict is in fact unanimous or 11-1. 
In such a case, each convicting juror would reasonably believe that 
his or her vote was not in fact necessary for the conviction. Each 
juror might believe that the defendant would have been convicted 
with or without that j�or's vote. Granted, some jurors might be 
mistaken in this belief. For example, an influential juror's willing­
ness to convict might sway others, in which case that juror might 
well have been a but-for cause of the conviction. Nonetheless, it is 
easy to see how jurors on a jury with "extra" votes for conviction 
might be able to ease their own sense of agency in the verdict. 
But what about verdicts that come in "on the number," with 
precisely the ten votes needed for conviction? In those cases, it 
might seem that at least the convicting jurors would feel agency -
would know that the verdict did in fact depend upon their concur­
rence. Maybe. It is entirely possible, however, that even the juror 
casting the critical tenth vote would be able to escape acknowledg­
ing agency in the verdict. For a convicting juror to feel full respon­
sibility for the conviction, he or she would need to be convinced 
that neither of the two holdouts could have ever been persuaded to 
vote for a conviction. The tenth juror, indeed each convicting juror, 
might well believe that one of the holdouts would have given in 
eventually. If so, he or she would understand his concurrence not 
129. 494 U.S. 433, 452 (1990). 
130. State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25, 39 (N.C. 1995). 
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as a but-for cause of the conviction, but merely as a concession to 
the inevitable. 
Indeed, that tenth juror would probably be right. Research sug­
gests that nine out of ten verdicts, even where unanimity is re­
quired, eventually go the way of the initial poll.131 Holdouts 
eventually go along with the majority. It is not clear whether this is 
a consequence of reasoned deliberation, as one might hope, or a 
result of pure exhaustion or pressure. It remains the case, however, 
that a juror casting the tenth and deciding vote in a 10�2 regime 
would have every reason to expect that if he or she did not give in, 
someone else would. Accordingly, only unanimity can ensure a 
sense of agency. 
Agency is an individual, rather than a group, experience. The 
Supreme Court of California called attention to this reality in the 
context of reviewing jury instructions which, like those described 
above, asked the jury to serve as the conscience of the community. 
The court noted that "[t]o the extent that the proposed instructions 
intimate that the jury must reach such decision in accordance with 
the community conscience, they are incorrect. The verdict must ex­
press the individual conscience of each juror."132 
Conscience is like that. While it reflects and emerges from col­
lective identity, it works only upon the individual - the mob hav­
ing, as the saying goes, none at all. For juries to take responsibility 
on the community's behalf, jurors, as individuals, must do so. And 
for any juror to feel truly responsible for a verdict, he or she needs 
to understand that he or she could have hung the thing. 
C. Punishment 
Juries cannot take responsibility, on the community's behalf, for 
what we as a community are required to do, unless they know what 
we are doing. If the jury is to be the forum in which each of us 
takes a turn confronting and acknowledging agency in troubling 
judgments, jurors must understand what those judgments are. I 
have argued above that for juries to serve their responsibility-taking 
function, they must understand themselves as participants rather 
131. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 488 ("[W]here there is an initial majority 
either for conviction or for acquittal, the jury in roughly nine out of ten cases decides in the 
direction of the initial majority."); see also JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
THE AMERICAN JURY 286-87 (1987); MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF 
GROUP SIZE AND SoCIAL DECISION RULE 94 (1977); cf. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 128, at 99-
106 & 103 tbl. 6.2. 
132. People v. Harrison, 381 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1963) (noting further that "[y]our verdict 
must express the individual opinion of each juror" (quoting trial court's jury instructions)). 
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than as commentators. While the jury's primary role is to figure out 
what happened, jurors cannot, if they are to feel agency in the judg­
ment, understand themselves as doing that and nothing more. They 
must recognize as well that they are determining what will happen 
next. Juries should know what will happen to a defendant if they 
convict. Juries should be instructed as to what punishment, or what 
possible range of punishments, will be imposed in the event of a 
conviction. 
This argument, I recognize, runs counter to current doctrine. In 
cases in which juries play no role in sentencing, jurors are generally 
not informed as to what punishment will likely attend a convic­
tion.133 The rationale for this practice was neatly captured by the 
United States Supreme Court, in Shannon v. United States, in which 
the Court observed that "providing jurors sentencing information 
invites them to ponder matters not within their province, distracts 
them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong 
possibility of confusion."134 As the Court recognized, "[t]he princi­
ple that juries are not to consider the consequences of their verdicts 
is a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system be­
tween judge and jury."135 In most categories of noncapital cases, 
juries convict and judges sentence. The Court elaborated as 
follows: 
The jury's function is to find the facts and to decide whether, on those 
facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by con­
trast, imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at 
a guilty verdict. Information regarding the consequences of a verdict 
is therefore irrelevant to the jury's task.136 
The operating assumption here is that factfinding is the jury's 
sole function. In this light, information regarding sentencing does 
133. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994); see also United States v. 
Richardson, 130 F.3d 765, 778 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Curry contends that, given his culpability and 
the severity of the sentence he was facing, he should have been allowed to tell the jury of his 
possible punishment during closing argument. Unfortunately for him, arguing punishment to 
a jury is taboo . . . .  "), revd. on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1707 (1999); United States v. Lewis, 
110 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir.) ("In [defendant's] trial, the jury had no sentencing function, and 
no statute required that the jury be informed of the consequences of the verdict. The district 
court correctly refused to allow [the defendant] to argue about his potential punishment."), 
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 854 (1997). Juries are, of course permitted to consider punishment 
when, as in capital cases, sentencing is part of the jury's doctrinal function. See, e.g., 
Mahaffey v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 684 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel and noting that "Mahaffey's counsel presented a coherent closing argument to the 
jury . . . . [He] discussed the nature of punishment and argued that the jury should act 
mercifully and not be responsible for an individual's death"), revd. in part on other grounds, 
162 F.3d 481 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1786 (1999). 
134. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579. 
135. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579. 
136. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579. 
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appear "irrelevant to the jury's task."137 H, however, the jury is not 
merely making decisions but is also being asked to take responsibil­
ity for those decisions, sentencing information emerges as not only 
relevant but essential. Juries cannot take responsibility for what 
they do if they do not know what they are doing. 
Given that a refusal to provide juries with sentencing informa­
tion is a consequence or manifestation of the judicial division of 
labor, through which juries convict and judges sentence, it is worth 
looking more closely at that division. It appears that the bifurcation 
of criminal trials in this way is itself partially explainable as a re­
sponse to the very perplexity of judgment that I am arguing we as a 
community ought to confront. As Thomas Green has observed, this 
"phenomenon of bifurcation is a central feature of the approach we 
take to the criminal law, one of those developments that tell us a 
great deal about who we are, or what we seek to be. "138 On 
Green's reading, this long-standing split between conviction and 
sentencing was deepened and entrenched during the Progressive 
Era in response to our deep uncertainty regarding free will. At 
trial, the jury would determine guilt or innocence according to 
traditional, generally accepted notions of personal responsibility. 
At the sentencing phase, however, judges were to consider more 
individualized, explanatory, or mitigating factors such as the "de­
fendant's background, upbringing, associates, and so on - matters 
rarely formally admissible during the trial . . . .  "139 
In this way the bifurcation of the trial process allows us, so long 
as we do not examine the matter too closely, to understand our­
selves as both a community that believes in holding people respon­
sible for their actions and a progressive community that recognizes 
and appreciates the influences of upbringing, environment, and sim­
ilar individualized considerations, on human behavior. Unfortu­
nately, this s ame bifurcation, depending upon how it is 
implemented, might say something else about us as well - some­
thing substantially less flattering "about who we are, or what we 
seek to be."140 Ironically, a method developed in part to help us 
deal fairly with the problem of judgment is now employed to help 
us avoid confronting that problem. 
Consider the concrete circumstances under which defendants 
might most want juries to have sentencing information. The dif-
137. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579. 
138. Green, supra note 37, at 1923. 
139. See id. at 1923-25. 
140. Id. at 1923. 
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ficulty arises when the punishment a defendant will receive if con­
victed is substantially more harsh than the jury might reasonably 
expect. The paradigmatic cases arise under "three strikes" statutes, 
which mandate dramatically increased sentences for defendants 
with prior felony convictions. In such cases, it is feared that juries 
will refuse to convict if informed of the extended sentence that will 
accompany conviction for what may seem to the jury a relatively 
minor offense.141 
In these contexts, talk about juries being "confused" appears 
somewhat misleading, if not disingenuous. Jurors asked to sentence 
a person to life in prison for holding an ounce of marijuana would 
not be confused - they would be unwilling. They would be under­
standably hesitant to look a man or woman in the eye and take 
responsibility for imposing what appears to be a disproportionate 
punishment. Seen in its best light, concealing from jurors the con­
sequences of their decisions might be described as a precom­
mitment strategy - a way of protecting against the possibility that 
people will shrink from a difficult task. But what a cowardly strat­
egy it is. In order to ensure that we do not blink when called upon 
to do a difficult task, we contrive to do the job with our eyes closed 
entirely. 
The problem is not juror confusion but community cowardice. 
Administering a troubling three-strikes statute through the medium 
of blinkered juries represents an ignoble, if cleverly designed, 
method of assigning responsibility without anyone ever having to 
take responsibility for that assignment.142 If we as a community 
truly feel it is appropriate to sentence a person to life in prison for 
any third felony conviction, we should be willing to look that person 
in the eye and say so. What we should not do is assign this difficult 
and perplexing task to those who know not what they do. 
141. An interesting variation on this theme occurs when the punishment a defendant will 
receive is less than what the jury might expect. In State v. Short, 618 A.2d 316, 321-23 (NJ. 
1993), a murder case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the jury should not have 
been informed that if the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of man­
slaughter, he would be acquitted because the statute of limitations had run as to that offense. 
The court reasoned that, given that information, the jury might bring in a murder conviction 
even if they felt that only manslaughter was warranted. 
142. Paul Robinson has argued that three-strikes statutes, as well as other similar sen­
tencing policies, are not really about assigning responsibility, but in fact methods of achieving 
incapacitation - responses not to individual desert but to perceived future dangerousness. 
Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal 
Justice (unpublished manuscript). Assuming Robinson is correct, my argument remains. 
Whatever we hope to accomplish through the imposition of criminal sentences, we ought to 
be able to acknowledge our own agency in imposing those sentences. 
2446 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2381 
D. A "Responsibility Instruction" 
As I have argued above in attempting to look at the ongoing 
debate over jury nullification through the lens provided by the no­
tions of responsibility-taking and decisionmaking, coercion subverts 
agency. If juries are to stand in for the community in taking respon­
sibility for convictions, they should not feel that they are being co­
erced. Juries ought to understand that they are being asked, rather 
than required, to perform a difficult and important task. We as a 
community want juries to convict when the evidence warrants; we 
need for them to do so. But if juries are to feel responsible for 
convictions, they need to understand that they have the power not 
to convict. We need for juries to follow instructions, but we ought 
to hope as well that they do not understand themselves as "just 
following orders." 
This does not mean that jury instructions should advocate or 
even suggest nullification. Nor do I argue that juries have a right to 
nullify. I am not talking about rights, but about obligations and 
agency. Consider the following possible jury instruction: 
Ladies and gentlemen, you are called upon to perform a difficult 
and important job. First of all, you are being asked to decide whether 
the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
did in fact commit the crime for which he is charged. If you deter­
mine that the State has not met this burden, you are to acquit the 
defendant and set him free. If you decide that the State has in fact 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed this 
crime, your responsibility is to convict. 
In performing this difficult and important job, each of you should 
understand that the responsibility for this decision is entirely yours 
and that you will not be required to explain or justify your verdict 
except to your own conscience. If you acquit this defendant, he will 
go free today. If you convict, I will sentence him to __ [as required 
by federal law] or __ [depending upon my analysis of mitigating 
factors]. I am aware that this is a terrible burden that you are asked 
to bear on behalf of your community. But our system depends upon 
each of us taking a tum, serving on juries, and bearing that burden as 
honestly, fairly, and bravely as we can. 
It seems to me that such an instruction might fix responsibility with­
out unduly encouraging nullification. 
As I have acknowledged, measures that serve to increase jurors' 
sense of responsibility present the risk that we might put too much 
weight on the shoulders of the jury. By continuing to require una­
nimity from criminal trial juries, by making juries aware of the pun­
ishment that will accompany a conviction, and by making sure they 
understand that no one will question them if they acquit, we in-
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crease the chance that juries will simply refuse to convict - that 
they will nullify. Perhaps a responsibility instruction would increase 
this risk unacceptably. Jurors made too vividly aware of their own 
agency and responsibility might lack the courage to convict. In the 
end, we cannot hope to express more courage than we have - to 
describe ourselves as braver than we are. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Plato argued that responsibility for the conviction of criminals, 
and for the resolution of at least some civil suits, ought to rest with 
laymen rather than with professional judges: 
In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to par­
ticipate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may 
reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the deci­
sion . . . .  And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have 
a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt 
to imagine that he has no share in the state at all.143 
To this I would add that when the State judges a wrongdoer, all 
judge and might reasonably be asked to acknowledge responsibility 
for that judgment, for he who feels no responsibility' for the admin­
istration of justice is apt to feel that he has no responsibility for the 
State at all. 
I cannot prove that if we allow ourselves to become a cowardly 
society we will slip into cruelty. Much less do I claim that accepting 
agency in assignments of blame is the best or only way to display 
courage. I simply suggest that we might want to be the kind of 
people who do not always hide from our tragic choices and that 
juries, conceived of as institutions through which we each take turns 
confronting the perplexity of judgment, offer one way of owning up 
to what we find necessary to do. 
143. PLATO, Laws IV16S, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 529 (B. Jowett trans., Random 
House rev. ed. 1937). 
